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INTRODUCTION
A new constitutional crisis has been thrust upon the American
body politic.' The crisis arises from a dispute concerning the allocation
of legal authority for the interpretation, and especially for the reinter-
pretation, of international agreements.' Once a sleepy backwater re-
served for specialized scholars,' the issue of treaty interpretation has
I See The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-3, 197 (1987) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Senator Biden); id. at
54 (statement of Senator Nunn). But see id. at 112, 444-45 (statement of Senator Hol-
lings) (suggesting that the ABM Treaty reinterpretation issue is not a "constitutional
crisis"); id. at 123 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Adviser)
(same).
I Unlike domestic United States law, international law generally does not differ-
entiate between "treaties" and "other international agreements." See Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2, para. 1(a),
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 876 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention];
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE STUDY FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTs: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 60 (Comm. Print 1984) [herein-
after ROLE OF THE SENATE]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 301, 303 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
This Article will use the term "treaty" to refer to either type of international
agreement, unless the context indicates otherwise. Cf Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S.
25, 36 (1982) (holding that statutory reference to "treaty" embraces executive agree-
ments as well as Article II treaties).
3 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 317 (statement of Professor Louis Henkin)
(noting that the treaty clause of the Constitution has "not been a source of serious
controversy during the two centuries of our national life under the Constitution").
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drawn the President and Congress into stark confrontation4 and gener-
ated splashy headlines.'
This attention and furor are well-deserved. The clash over treaty
interpretation powers is no mere lawyers' debate concerning the inten-
tions of the Constitution's Framers.' It directly affects the implementa-
tion of international obligations shaping the national security of the
United States. In particular, the 1972 Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems ("ABM Treaty") 7 and the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces ("INF Treaty")8 have been embroiled in an attempt by
the Executive to reserve the right unilaterally to reinterpret treaties.
What is immediately at stake in executive reinterpretation has been a
threat to gut the central purposes of the ABM Treaty and to abort the
nascent INF Treaty. Unless corrected, attempts by the Executive to
usurp treaty reinterpretation power will, in the longer term, undermine
United States arms control policies, jeopardize future Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks ("START") agreements, and weaken the security of
the international community.
These circumstances prompt reevaluation of three questions that
' See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ABM TREATY INTERPRE-
TATION RESOLUTION, S. REP. No. 164, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1987) [hereinafter
1987 SFRC REPORT] (stating that "the Reagan Administration's 'reinterpretation' of
the ABM Treaty constitutes the most flagrant abuse of the Constitution's treaty power
in 200 years of American history").
5 See Norman, Showdown Nears on ABM Treaty, 238 SCIENCE 147 (1987);
Smith, When Treaty Interpretations Differ, Who Has the Last Word?, Wash. Post,
Feb. 17, 1988, at A17, col. 1; Gordon, Within the Arms Debate, a 2d Debate, N. Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
Legal scholars have also looked at the reinterpretation question. See Chayes &
Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The
Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986); Kennedy, Treaty In-
terpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and
Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1986); Klema, Strategic Defense Initiative and
the New Interpretation of the ABM Treaty, 10 ASILS INT'L L.J. 149 (1986); Sherr,
Sound Legal Reasoning or Policy Expedient?, 11 INT'L SECURITY 71 (Winter 1986-
87).
6 See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 263 (statement of Senator Biden)
("[W]hat is at issue here is decidedly not a lawyers' quarrel. We are witnessing a
major assault on the premises and structure of a national nuclear strategy. . . .[and] a
subtle but equally significant assault on the Constitution's allocation of the treaty
power."); 1987 SFRC REPORT, supra note 4, at 46-47 ("The issue may appear. . . to
be nothing more than a technical dispute . . . - a lawyers' quarrel. But it is far more
than that, in both substance and constitutional significance.").
I Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
United States-USSR, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
I Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles,
Dec. 8, 1987, United States-USSR, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc. 1459 [hereinafter
INF Treaty]; see also SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE INF TREATY,
S. EXEC. REP. No. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter INFT REPORT] (an-
alyzing the meaning and impact of the INF Treaty).
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are fundamental to the domestic and international law of treaties: (1)
What are the respective roles of Congress and the President in creating
international legal obligations for the United States? (2) How is au-
thority for interpreting international agreements divided among the
three branches of the federal government? and, of the most pressing
immediate concern, (3) Under what circumstances may the Executive
Branch "reinterpret" a treaty that previously has received an authorita-
tive national meaning?
This Article refutes the rationale put forth by the Executive
Branch, known as the Sofaer Doctrine, which purports to provide a
legal foundation for the Executive's claim to powers of reinterpreta-
tion.9 After demonstrating that assertions of unilateral reinterpretation
powers are unconstitutional and violate international law, I offer an
alternative jurisprudential model.' ° This alternative derives from the
thesis that the power to create treaty obligations for the United States is
shared between the Executive and Legislative Branches. Once an inter-
pretation of a treaty has become entrenched in United States domestic
law through the joint action of the Senate and President, it cannot be
altered unilaterally by a reinterpretation sponsored by either branch
alone."
On occasion it may be difficult to ascertain whether a particular
interpretation has, in fact, become entrenched as a necessary part of
United States law. Nevertheless, the principle of durability, and its ap-
plication to current and future interpretation controversies are clear:
The Executive's attempt to reinterpret established aspects of a treaty is
an unconstitutional usurpation of power. This conclusion is supported
by a three part analysis.
Part I is primarily historical. It offers concrete examples of rein-
terpretation disputes that underscore the importance of the current de-
bate, and provide a factual base for subsequent legal discussion. Four
major instances of prior clashes between Congress and the Executive
over treaty interpretation are described: 1) the Geneva Protocol on
chemical weapons, 2 which sparked controversy over the legal status of
9 See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 249-69 and accompanying text.
" Conversely, where no authoritative interpretation under United States law has
been established for the treaty, each branch of the federal government may proceed,
pursuant to its own law-making operations, to derive meaning from the ambiguous or
controversial passages. This process of initial interpretation cannot effectively impose a
fixed meaning for the treaty that binds other branches of the United States government.
12 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature June
17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva
Protocol].
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herbicides and riot-control agents; 2) the SALT I Interim Agreement,"3
which supplied a problematic definition of "heavy" missiles; 3) the
ABM Treaty, which generated a maelstrom of debate concerning its
constraints on the legality of the Strategic Defense Initiative; and 4) the
INF Treaty, which prompted the most recent arguments regarding the
limits on future reinterpretation by the Executive. In Part II, the Arti-
cle draws principles of treaty interpretation and constitutional preroga-
tives from both international law and United States constitutional law
in order to construct a stable and consistent framework for resolving
interpretation disputes. In the process, support is generated for the con-
tention that the Executive's asserted power to reinterpret treaties vio-
lates both international law and the United States Constitution.
Part III considers a variety of hypothetical factual scenarios rele-
vant to treaty interpretation. This exercise puts the framework of prin-
ciples from Part II into practice, and presents a comprehensive model
of interpretation. This model offers eight considerations that should
serve to resolve many of the ambiguities currently plaguing the inter-
pretation process. Furthermore, the real flexibility it permits avoids the
predetermined and sterile exercise that characterizes the Sofaer Doc-
trine. The process of treaty interpretation will continue to be an inher-
ently complex one using the eight-pronged model, but it need not be as
contentious as it has become.
The Article concludes with some observations and recommenda-
tions. First, as mandated by both legal and policy imperatives, unilat-
eral modifications in the meaning of United States treaty obligations
should not be undertaken easily or often. Second, the Senate has a legit-
imate stake in reasserting its role in creating treaties. Third, I urge
acceptance of the alternative to the Sofaer Doctrine presented here in
order to ease the treaty-making process for both the Executive and
Congress. The always-uncertain progression of a treaty should not be
burdened any more than it already is. Finally, while it is difficult to
imagine in the context of a treaty involving arms and the Soviets, I
propose that even here, the United States should not overlook the possi-
bility of authoritative international adjudication.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
FOUR CASE STUDIES OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
The current debate over treaty interpretation is not the first of its
" Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, United States-USSR, 23 U.S.T. 3462,
T.I.A.S. No. 7504 [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
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kind. In fact, similar controversies regarding other arms control treaties
and other administrations foreshadowed today's struggles. A brief study
of the background and results of these earlier skirmishes will help place
the current debate in the proper context, and will highlight the signifi-
cance that the Senate places on communications from the Executive in
fulfilling its constitutionally mandated role of providing advice and
consent.
A. The Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare
The history of the Geneva Protocol illustrates the importance
Congress places on the Executive's representations regarding treaty in-
terpretation. In 1925, the United States signed the Geneva Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 4 The Protocol was
limited essentially to a wartime "non-use" agreement and did not pro-
hibit the production and deployment of chemical weapons."5 While the
Geneva Protocol was ratified by many countries (some adopting restric-
tive reservations) and entered into force on February 8, 1928,16 it re-
mained unratified by the United States for almost fifty years."7
14 See Geneva Protocol, supra note 12; UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL & Dis-
ARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS
AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS 9 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter ACDA TREATY
BOOK]. The Geneva Protocol was one of the earliest modern arms control agreements,
growing out of 19th century attempts to regulate chemical weapons. See id. at 3-4;
Smith, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Yellow Rain"
and Arms Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1031-32.
11 See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 9. The negotiating parties were
motivated, in large measure, by the experience of World War I, in which the massive,
albeit unsophisticated, use of chemical weapons by both sides resulted in approximately
100,000 fatalities. See Chemical Warfare, ECONOMIST, June 4, 1988, at 19, 20. Chem-
ical weapons were perceived as a particularly loathsome form of combat, suited for
international prohibition. See Satchell, A Plague of "Hellish Poison," U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Oct. 26, 1987, at 30, 30.
16 See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 14. The Protocol was ratified by
all the great powers, except the United States and Japan, before World War II. See id.
at 9. Several nations have deposited reservations limiting the application of the Geneva
Protocol to situations of reciprocity, retaining the right to use chemical weapons against
a party or non-party who uses them first. See Smith, supra note 14, at 1037-38.
The Geneva Protocol generally was observed throughout World War II, although
Italy did use chemical weapons in its Ethiopian campaign. See ACDA TREATY BOOK,
supra note 14, at 9. More recently, there have been reports that Iraq has used chemical
weapons in its war with Iran. See Ember, Worldwide Spread of Chemical Arms Re-
ceiving Increased Attention, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 14, 1986, at 8,
8; see also Pear, U.S. Will Propose Wide U.N. Powers on Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (noting the Reagan Administration's concern regarding the
evidence that Libya was acquiring the means to produce chemical weapons).
17 See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 13 (Protocol signed by President
Ford on Jan. 22, 1975). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported
1989]
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By 1970, the controversy within the United States had narrowed
to a question about the scope of the treaty ban: Did the Protocol apply
only to lethal chemical agents, or did it also prohibit the use in war of
non-toxic riot-control agents and herbicides?"8 The Nixon Administra-
tion maintained that the Treaty had the more limited scope, while the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, like most of the international
community, 9 favored the broader interpretation. "
In 1974, the Ford Administration began a new effort to secure
Senate consent to the Protocol's ratification.21 On December 10, 1974,
Dr. Fred Ikle, then Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, testified that the Executive Branch still adhered
to its earlier view regarding the appropriate scope of the Treaty, but
was prepared, as a matter of national policy, to renounce the first use
in war of herbicides and riot-control agents, except for specified
circumstances.22
the Geneva Protocol in 1926, but it was not brought to a floor vote. President Truman
later withdrew the Geneva Protocol from the Senate and it received little notice thereaf-
ter. See id. at 10.
1" See id. at 11. Under the narrow construction, in war a party would be allowed
to utilize certain non-lethal chemicals of the sort occasionally employed in peacetime to
clear vegetation or to quell civil disturbances (such as tear gas or irritant agents).
Under the broader view, those applications could continue in peacetime, but could not
be introduced as war-fighting measures. See id. at 10.
1" See id. at 10-11; Smith, supra note 14, at 1036.
2 See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 11. The Nixon Administration
resubmitted the Geneva Protocol to the Senate on August 19, 1970, proposing an ac-
companying reservation reaffirming the position that the Treaty did not prohibit use of
riot-control agents and herbicides in war. Senator Fulbright, chair of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, opposed ratification of the Treaty with the restrictive reservation, and
the Committee deferred further action. See id. at 11-12.
21 The renewed interest in bringing the Geneva Protocol into effect for the United
States came in conjunction with the effort to seek Senate advice and consent to the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, opened for signature April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583,
T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1971 U.N. Juridical Yearbook 118 [hereinafter Biological Weapons
Convention]; ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 122.
Under the Biological Weapons Convention, parties undertake not to develop, pro-
duce, stockpile or acquire biological agents or toxins, or weapons for their delivery. See
Biological Weapons Convention, supra, art. I., 26 U.S.T. at 587, T.I.A.S. No. 8062.
The Treaty was negotiated principally by the United States and the Soviet Union, and
subsequently was opened for multilateral signature. See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra
note 14, at 121-22.
22 See Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearings on S.Res. 48
Relating to Comprehensive Interpretation of the Geneva Protocol Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 SFRC
Hearings]. The Ikle statement reserved the right to use herbicides for the control of
vegetation inside United States bases and installations and to use riot control agents in
defensive military modes, such as in rescue missions or where enemy troops hide behind
civilians as screens. See id.
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The Foreign Relations Committee then favorably reported the Ge-
neva Protocol by a unanimous vote," attaching particular importance
to Dr. Ikle's written response in the following colloquy in connection
with his testimony 4 :
Question . . . . Assuming the Senate were to give its
advice and consent to ratification on the grounds proposed by
the Administration, what legal impediment would there be to
subsequent Presidential decisions broadening the permissible
uses of riot-control agents?
Answer. There would be no formal legal impediment to
such a decision. However, the policy which was presented to
the Committee will be inextricably linked with the history of
Senate consent to ratification of the Protocol with its consent
dependent upon its observance. If a future administration
should change this policy without Senate consent whether in
practice or by a formal policy change, it would be inconsis-
tent with the history of the ratification, and could have ex-
tremely grave political repercussions and as a result is ex-
tremely unlikely to happen. 5
The Geneva Protocol was unanimously approved by the Senate on
December 16, 1974,26 and ratified by President Ford on January 22,
1975.27 United States policy and practice have continued to be consis-
tent with the constraints of the Ikle statement, and the issue of possible
derogation of the 1974 policy statement and testimony has, to date, re-
mained latent.2" Nonetheless, this example indicates how important
It is noteworthy that in questioning by Senator Church, Ike testified that the
national policy restricting the use of herbicides and riot-control agents should be stated
in the report of the Foreign Relations Committee, rather than in an understanding
attached to the instrument of ratification, which would be "a more formal step" and
possibly "an unnecessary complication." Id. at 17.
23 See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF
1925, S. EXEC. REP. No. 35, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974). The Administration had
recommended adoption of a reservation that would limit the application of the Geneva
Protocol to situations of reciprocity - that is, if lethal weapons were used first against
United States troops in war, the United States would be legally free to retaliate in kind.
See 1974 SFRC Hearings, supra note 22, at 18-19 (statement of Dr. Fred Ikle, Direc-
tor of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
24 See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that the Committee
attached particular importance to Ikle's response).
25 1974 SFRC Hearings, supra note 22, at 29.
See 120 CONG. REC. S40,067-68 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974).
2 See ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 13.
28 President Ford issued an executive order reinforcing the restrictions on the use
of chemical weapons. See Exec. Order No. 11,850, 3 C.F.R. 149 (1975), reprinted in
50 U.S.C.A. § 1511, at 225 (West Supp. 1988).
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Congress considers Executive Branch representations regarding the in-
terpretation of a treaty. Indeed, when the national security of the
United States is directly involved, the stakes in the battle are enormous.
B. The SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms
SALT I, the first series of United States-USSR Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks,29 resulted in 1972 in two important international
agreements: the ABM Treaty 0 (discussed below), and the Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms. 1 The Interim Agreement was intended as a
partial, temporary measure, 2 essentially to "freeze" for five years
(pending the negotiation of a more comprehensive accord) the status
quo regarding the most important strategic offensive systems.33
One of its most important sets of provisions dealt with the issue of
"modern heavy" missiles, and the Executive's handling of this topic is
instructive for our purposes. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
United States was particularly concerned with the emerging fleet of So-
29 See S. TALBOTT, ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT 1119-24 (1979); T.
WOLFE, THE SALT EXPERIENCE 8-14 (1979); ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14,
at 132.
o See ABM Treaty, supra note 7.
Si See Interim Agreement, supra note 13. The Interim Agreement was approved
by Congress on September 30, 1972, in Pub. L. 92-448, 86 Stat. 746 (1972). See gener-
ally HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE AGREEMENT ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, H.R. REP. No. 1324, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter HFAC REPORT] (report filed with agreement).
32 See Interim Agreement, supra note 13, arts. I, III & VIII.2; ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 14, at 148.
11 To cap the superpowers' strategic arsenals under the Interim Agreement,
neither side was permitted to begin the construction of additional fixed launchers for
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ("ICBMs"). Moreover, launchers for Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles ("SLBMs") and SLBM-carrying submarines were limited
and could be deployed in greater numbers only if launchers for corresponding older
ICBMs were retired. See Interim Agreement, supra note 13, arts. I & III.
ICBMs are land-based missiles capable of delivering nuclear missiles at ranges of
3,500 miles or more. SLBMs are sea-based missiles capable of 3imilar ranges carried
aboard submarines. The Interim Agreement applies to launchers of missiles, rather
than the missiles themselves, because the launchers (permanent holes in the ground
(called "silos") for fixed ICBMs and vertical submarine tubes for SLBMs) are easier to
identify and count by satellite photo reconnaissance, thereby ameliorating the task of
verifying compliance with the Treaty's limitations. See N. CALvo-GOLLER & M.
CALVO, THE SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTENT-APPLICATION-VERIFICATION 261
(1987).
The Interim Agreement permitted the United States to retain its 1054 ICBM
launchers and 656 SLBM launchers and allowed the United States to deploy an addi-
tional 54 SLBM launchers by retiring a corresponding number of older ICBM launch-
ers. The Soviet Union was authorized to retain its 1618 ICBM launchers and 740
SLBM launchers, which it could increase to 950 with corresponding reductions. See
ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 149.
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viet "heavy" intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), represented by
the SS-9, then the largest and most powerful weapon in the Soviet arse-
nal.34 The United States had and sought no exact counterpart for this
weapon, but wanted to control the size of the Soviet deployment. 5 The
Interim Agreement therefore prohibited the construction of additional
fixed, land-based launchers for heavy missiles, 6 and also prohibited the
conversion of launchers for light or older ICBMs into launchers for
modern heavy ICBMs."7
The delegations, however, were unable to agree upon a precise
definition of a "heavy" missile. At the conclusion of the negotiations,
the United States delegation made a "unilateral statement" ' that the
United States "would consider any ICBM having a volume signifi-
cantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on
either side to be a heavy ICBM.""9 The United States delegation added
"' See G. SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF SALT I 388-89 (1985); S. TAL-
BOTT, supra note 29, at 24-27; ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 148; News
Conference Remarks by Presidential Assistant Kissinger, May 29, 1972, 69 ACDA
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1972, at 235, 236-37. The SS-9 was designed to re-
place the second generation Soviet ICBM, the SS-7. The SS-9's greater accuracy,
throw-weight and its potential for delivering multiple re-entry vehicles led many in the
United States to conclude that it was deployed as a counter-force weapon targeted
against the United States Minuteman ICBMs and their launch control centers. See R.
BERMAN & J. BAKER, SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES: REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSES
53 (1982). This led to serious debate whether the Soviets accepted the American doc-
trine of mutual assured destruction or were interested in creating a destabilizing pre-
emptive strike capability.
" The United States did have fifty-four Titan II missiles, which were "large" but
not "modern," and therefore not covered by this aspect of the Interim Agreement. The
Titan, due to primitive inertial guidance systems, was relatively inaccurate, so it carried
a large-yield warhead to compensate. It also employed liquid fuel, which increased its
unreliability and bulk. One of the reasons the United States never deployed a weapon
equivalent to the SS-9 was the American technological superiority in miniaturization
and accuracy. When American military doctrine shifted to flexible response and mutual
assured destruction ("MAD") under President Kennedy, technology permitted develop-
ment of the Minuteman missile. Small (one-fifth the size of Titan), accurate, relatively
inexpensive and solid-fueled, the Minuteman eliminated the United States' need for a
heavy-payload missile with counter-force capabilities. The United States military deter-
mined that it was not interested in procuring heavy missiles, preferring to concentrate
instead on larger numbers of smaller missiles. See SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COM-
MITTEE, REPORT ON THE SALT II TREATY, S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 68-69, 167-73 (1979) [hereinafter SFRC SALT II REPORT]; S. TALBOTT, supra
note 29, at 25.
38 See Interim Agreement, supra note 13, art. I.
3 See Interim Agreement, supra note 13, art. II.
38 During the SALT I negotiations, unilateral statements were utilized to state
formally for the record one nation's view of a contested matter on which agreement had
not been reached. Selected unilateral statements (as well as certain "agreed statements"
and "common understandings" which reflected details of areas of consensus) were pub-
lished alongside the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. See HFAC REPORT,
supra note 31, at 5; AODA TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 135-36, 143-47, 154-57.
" Interim Agreement, supra note 13, Unilateral Statement D.
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that "[t]he United States proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side
will give due account to this consideration."4 ° The USSR delegation, on
the other hand, continued to insist that an agreed definition of heavy
ICBMs was not essential, and that the Soviet government did not agree
with the United States's unilateral statement.4
When the Nixon Administration presented the Interim Agreement
to the Congress,42 the unilateral statement was attached. 43 Administra-
tion spokespersons never exactly said that the USSR had formally ac-
cepted the United States definition of heavy missiles, but they nonethe-
less conveyed to the Congress and to the public the impression that this
matter would not prove contentious in implementing the agreement.44
For example, then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger de-
scribed the American unilateral statement on heavy missiles as a
"safeguard." 4
Shortly after the Interim Agreement entered into force, however,
the Soviet Union began to flight test and deploy the new SS-19
ICBM, 46 which was a "middle" case, being heavier than the heaviest
40 Id.
41 The Soviets declined to define heavy missiles, in order to protect their fourth
generation ICBMs then under development, particularly the massive SS-18 and the
smaller SS-19. The United States knew these missiles were under development at the
time. See G. DUFFY, COMPLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL 142 (1988);
see also Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 137-38 (statement of Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard N. Perle) (maintaining that the Soviet Union refused to define heavy
missiles because their new secret missile was so important to defense modernization);
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I
AGREEMENTS, SPECIAL REP. 55, at 2 (July 1979) (same); G. SMITH, supra note 34, at
388-91 (same).
42 The Interim Agreement was considered by both Houses of Congress as an exec-
utive agreement. The ABM Treaty, on the other hand, was sent only to the Senate for
consideration as a treaty. See infra note 54.
"' The use of unilateral statements was criticized heavily after the Soviets failed to
honor the United States' position regarding heavy missiles. Observers commented that
unilateral statements were insufficient to bind the other party and simply provided a
road map of contentious issues that might divide the parties in the future implementa-
tion of the accord. See G. SMITH, supra note 34, at 460; S. TALBOTT, supra note 29,
at 30. In the SALT II Treaty, the United States did not rely upon any such unilateral
statements in the same way. See SFRC SALT II REPORT, supra note 35, at 114-16,
133-35.
44 See, e.g., G. DUFFY, supra note 41, at 142 (maintaining that Henry Kissinger
conveyed a misleading impression).
41 See Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms:
Hearings before the Comm. on Armed Services of the Senate, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 128
(1972) [hereinafter Military Implications Hearings] (reprinting Kissinger's statements
during White House press conference).
46 The SS-19 became a special concern to American officials because it was the
first large Soviet ICBM to be tested with multiple warheads, greatly expanding its
offensive potential. See R. BERMAN & J. BAKER, supra note 34, at 104-105.
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previous "light" missile (the SS-1 1,) but lighter than the lightest previ-
ous "heavy" missile (the SS-9).47 As such, the missile was inconsistent
with the position articulated in the United States's unilateral statement,
but it was not inconsistent with the textual limitations of the Treaty
itself.
The Soviet flight tests generated an extreme reaction from some
members of Congress, who complained that they had been misled by
the Nixon Administration into thinking that the Soviet Union would
not deploy any new missile inconsistent with the United States under-
standing, or that the United States would be able to respond vigorously
and effectively if the Soviets did so.4 In keeping with congressional
concerns, United States officials raised the issue of the SS-19 with the
Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission ("SCC"), the body
established by the ABM Treaty to deal with issues of Treaty imple-
mentation and compliance.49
Ultimately, however, the United States acknowledged that the SS-
19 could not be considered a violation of the Interim Agreement be-
cause the Soviet Union had never assented to the American definition of
a "heavy" missile. Nevertheless, the existence of larger and increasingly
capable ICBMs created significant security questions of concern to both
sides.50 Further SCC consideration of the SS-19 was ultimately de-
47 The United States delegation proposed that the dividing line between heavy and
light missiles should be a volume of seventy cubic meters. The delegations did agree
that the dimensions of ICBM launchers "[would] not be significantly increased," and
that this term barred increases of greater than 10-15% of the existing dimensions. See
Interim Agreement, supra note 13, Agreed Statement C, Common Understanding A;
Military Implications Hearings, supra note 45, at 363-64.
48 In retrospect, it appears that the statements of Administration spokespersons,
including Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Laird, in presenting
the Interim Agreement to the Senate, were factually accurate. The statements described
the delegations' inability to proceed beyond the level of a unilateral statement, and
never said that the Soviet Union had assented to the United States viewpoint. See Joint
Hearings, supra note 1, at 469 (statement of Sen. Hollings); Soviet Compliance with
Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Arms Control of the Comm. on Armed Services of the Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6,
13, 18-19 (1975) (colloquy between Senator Jackson and Secretary of Defense James
R. Schlesinger); Military Implications Hearings, supra note 45, at 128 (reprinting
comments by Secretary Kissinger during White House press conference); id. at 547-49
(testimony of Secretary Laird). The overall impression that was created in the minds of
many Senators, however, was that some sort of understanding had been reached regard-
ing the size of future missiles.
"' The Standing Consultative Commission is to "consider questions concerning
compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be consid-
ered ambiguous." ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. XIII; see also G. DuFrY, supra
note 41, at 163-84; N. CALvo-GOLLER & M. CALVO, supra note 33, at 299-327.
50 Kissinger stated, "I think it is at least open to question whether the United
States can hold the Soviet Union responsible for its own statements when the Soviet
Union has asserted that it does not accept this interpretation." Joint Hearings, supra
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ferred because the subsequent SALT II negotiations began to address
the question, finally writing a Treaty that included agreement upon a
specific definition of "heavy" missiles."
This episode highlighted for members of Congress the need to be
clear regarding the precise content of international agreements and the
constraints imposed upon the United States and other parties. Congres-
sional misunderstanding, due either to Senators' own failure to scruti-
nize the full meaning of executive representations, or to outright decep-
tion by the Executive, creates an extraordinarily unstable basis for
making and living under arms control treaties.5"
C. The ABM Treaty
The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems5"
also was signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in
1972 along with the SALT I Interim Agreement." It established a mu-
tual and strikingly-low level of strategic defense, forestalling, for the
most part, what might otherwise have developed into an expensive and
destabilizing race in ABM technology. 5 In the 15 years of its existence,
note 1, at 469 (statement of Senator Hollings) (reporting history of inability of the
United States's unilateral statement to bind the Soviet Union, and attributing statement
to Kissinger).
" See Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979,
United States-USSR (did not enter into force), art. 11.7, S. EXEC. Doc. Y, 96th Cong.,
1st. Sess. (1979) [hereinafter SALT II Treaty]. Under the provisions of the SALT II
Treaty, the SS-19 was considered to be the heaviest of the light ICBMs. See id. at art.
11.5 (Third Common Understanding).
" See infra notes 118-124 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the
United States is still bound internationally by the agreement as ratified, regardless of
how it was represented to the Congress by the Executive).
" ABM Treaty, supra note 7.
54 The Treaty received the Senate's advice and consent to ratification by a vote of
88-2. See 118 CONG. REC. 26,770 (1972).
'5 The ABM Treaty acknowledges and enhances the strategic concept of mutual
assured destruction ("MAD"), wherein each superpower is deterred from attacking the
other by fear of overwhelming, unstoppable retaliation. Initially, the Soviet Union was
reluctant to embrace this doctrine, arguing as the Reagan Administration later did, that
reliance upon defensive systems is preferable to reliance upon offenses and that efforts
to reduce the destructiveness of war were preferable to a policy of rendering each na-
tion defenseless. See, e.g., Chayes, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive, 5 PACE L. REV. 735, 737-38 (1984) (citing Premier Kosygin's exchanges with
Defense Secretary McNamara during the Glassboro summit).
Soviet military doctrine appears to have changed dramatically during this period,
leading to acceptance of the concept of deterrence. See, e.g., McGuire, Why the Soviets
Are Serious About Arms Control, in 36 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITI-
CAL SCIENCE, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 78, 78-86 (R. Laird ed. 1987) (noting that a
variety of factors, such as technological developments and the French withdrawal from
NATO, led the Soviets to reassess the risk of automatic escalation to central system
strategic exchanges during wartime).
[Vol. 137:1353
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
the ABM Treaty has come to be recognized as one of the most success-
ful and important arms control agreements.56
Under the ABM Treaty, the parties agreed "not to develop, test,
or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based",57 and to restrict their deployments
of fixed land-based ABM systems (the only permitted type) to just two
sites each. 58 The parties also dealt specifically with the problem of "ex-
otic" or "futuristic" ABM systems and components (such as high-en-
ergy lasers), which had yet to be created but which were then projected
to be capable of some day substituting for, and performing the function
of, ABM interceptor missiles or radars.59 The text of the Treaty and an
accompanying Agreed Statement 0 establish a regime for dealing with
these ABM systems based on "other physical principles" beyond those
of 1972-type technology."'
5 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 285 (statement of Senator Biden) (refer-
ring to the ABM Treaty as "the most important control agreement in existence");
ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Arms Control,
International Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1985) [hereinafter HFAC ABM Hearings] (reprinting a collection
of recent statements on the importance of the ABM Treaty by American and allied
officials); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON STRATEGIC FORCES REPORT, April 6, 1983,
at 5, 10, 12, 16-17 [hereinafter SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT] (noting the ABM
Treaty's limitation on the development of ballistic missile defenses).
5 ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. V.
58 See id., art. III. The number of sites permitted to each side was reduced to one
by a 1974 protocol. See Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile Systems, July 3, 1974, United States-USSR, 27 U.S.T. 1645, 1648 T.I.A.S. No.
8276 [hereinafter Protocol to the ABM Treaty].
" See ABM Treaty, supra note 7, Agreed Statement D. The 1972-era ABM
systems were based upon interceptor missiles, which would ascend from ground bases,
fly near the incoming warhead and explode. Systems based on "other physical princi-
ples" would include ground-based installations that might generate energy beams or
subatomic particle beams that would deposit lethal energy into the incoming warheads.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possessed such weapons in 1972, and
neither was close to developing the necessary technology, but systems of this type were
contemplated or at least imagined. See Strategic Defense Initiative: Hearings before
Subcomm. on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Services
Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 SDI Hearings] (statement
of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, chief SALT I negotiator) ("It was perfectly clear to
us that in 1972 the concepts of lasers and particle beam weapons and direct energy
weapons were well known."). The SALT I negotiations concerning exotic weapons
proved, however, to be difficult and protracted. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at
330 (supplementary responses of Raymond L. Garthoff).
6o ABM Treaty, supra note 7, Agreed Statement D.
81 The content of this regime has become controversial. Most experts believe that
the ABM Treaty included a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of mobile
ABM systems that embody either 1972-type or other technology. The Reagan Admin-
istration, however, concluded that the Treaty may be read to permit development and
testing, but not deployment, of mobile ABM systems based on "other physical princi-
ples." See infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
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For the first decade after its entry into force, the ABM Treaty
attracted relatively little attention. 2 That changed, however, on March
23, 1983, when President Reagan delivered his famous "Star Wars"
speech, 3 inaugurating the Strategic Defense Initiative ("SDI"),' 4 and
seeking to establish for the United States a defensive capability for ren-
dering incoming ballistic missile warheads "impotent and obsolete."65
The President declared that the SDI would initially be only a research
program, to be conducted in compliance with the ABM Treaty.66 If the
SDI research proved fruitful, it was suggested, the ABM Treaty ulti-
62 The major compliance-related issue concerning the ABM Treaty has been the
Soviet construction of a large phased-array radar installation at Abalakova near the city
of Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. The United States has made a formal charge that the radar
violates the ABM treaty. See Taubman, Moscow Proposes to Remove Radar Criticized
by U.S., N.Y. Times, July 20, 1988, at Al, col. 3; Gordon, Split Is Reported Over
ABM Accord, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1988, at A5, col. 1. Other, more minor implemen-
tation issues have surfaced over the years, but have not proved highly contentious. See,
e.g., T. LONGSTRETH, J. PIKE & J. RHINELANDER, THE IMPACT OF U.S. AND SO-
vIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ON THE ABM TREATY, NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN TO SAVE THE ABM TREATY 33-37 (1985) (describing the "gray area"
programs such as anti-satellite systems and anti-tactical ballistic missile systems that
both the United States and Soviet Union maintain fall outside the narrow interpreta-
tion of the ABM Treaty); A. SCHORR, LEGAL ISSUES OF THE "STAR WARS" DEFENSE
PROGRAM 9-17 (1984); Chayes, supra note 55, at 740-46; Haass, The ABM Treaty.
Verification and Compliance Issues, in THE ABM TREATY: To DEFEND OR NOT To
DEFEND? 121 (W. Stitzle, B. Jasani & R. Cowen eds. 1987).
63 National Security: President Reagan's address to the Nation, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRE. Doc. 442 (Mar. 23, 1983) [hereinafter Presidential address].
64 The United States had long maintained a relatively modest research program in
the area of ballistic missile defense, spending roughly $1 billion per year, primarily as a
hedge against a Soviet "breakout" of the ABM Treaty through new technology. The
SDI program, however, was to be vastly more ambitious and to receive a much higher
level of funding. See T. LONGSTRETH, J. PIKE & J. RHINELANDER, supra note 62, at
11-18. The Pentagon drew up plans for spending $70 billion on SDI between 1984
and 1993, and $14 billion has already been appropriated. See Star Wars Reality, 17
DEFENSE MONITOR 1, 1 (1988).
83 Presidential address, supra note 63, at 448. Many of the President's advisors
had, and still maintain, more modest goals for SDI. For example, developing a less-
than-perfect defensive system would complicate Soviet offensive planning and force the
Soviets to undertake higher offsetting expenditures. See 1985 SDI Hearings, supra
note 59, at 17-18 (testimony of Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, Director of the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative Organization, and Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIA-
TIVE ORGANIZATION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INI-
TIATIVE III, at 5-8 (June 1986); see also Address by Paul H. Nitze before the North
Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco, SDI: Its Nature and Rationale (Oct. 15, 1985),
reprinted in 85/2105 DEP'T ST. BULL. 69 (1985) (describing SDI as a cost-effective
defense that could so complicate first strike calculations as to make them virtually
impossible).
66 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITI-
ATIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note 65, at 7 ("It should be stressed that the SDI is a
research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a
decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. . . . All
research efforts will be fully compliant with United States treaty obligations.").
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mately would have to be renegotiated and amended."' Critics, however,
concluded that the Soviet Union would never agree to such a substan-
tial amendment - an amendment that would, in effect, gut the treaty's
central purposes. They argued that in order to pursue SDI, the United
States would ultimately have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, or
abrogate it."8
As SDI research progressed, the constraints of the ABM Treaty
loomed as a larger and more immediate hurdle to advanced develop-
ment and testing of esoteric anti-missile system components.6" Accord-
" See Smith, "Star Wars" Tests and the ABM Treaty, 229 SCIENCE 29, 29
(1985) (citing statement of ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman). President Reagan also
proposed sharing SDI technology with the Soviet Union, a proposal which generated a
great deal of controversy. See 1985 SDI Hearings, supra note 59, at 18-19, 94; Tran-
script of Group Interview with President at White House, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1983,
at A14, col. 2.
"8 See 1985 SDI Hearings, supra note 59, at 192 (statement of Ambassador
Smith). As the Ambassador stated:
Some officials speak of amending the [ABM] treaty [to permit SDI]. To
my mind that would be tantamount to having tried to amend the Volstead
Act to permit the sale of liquor. The recent reinterpretation of the treaty
is, I suppose, an effort to amend the treaty unilaterally as it becomes clear
that the Soviets have no interest in liberalizing existing constraints. They
seem to favor tightening the treaty.
Id.; see also Implications of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative and Antisatel-
lite Weapons Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International
Security and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 50
(1985) [hereinafter HCFA SDI Hearings] (statement of John Rhinelander) ( "I cannot
conceive of the Soviets agreeing to amend" the ABM Treaty to permit SDI); Chayes,
supra note 55, at 746 ("it is hard to hold out much hope for" renegotiation of the
ABM Treaty).
Some experts even argued that the Reagan Administration's announcement of SDI
and the preparations undertaken for ultimate termination of the ABM Treaty could
constitute an "anticipatory breach" of the Treaty, with immediate legal implications.
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 67, at 30 (citing statements of Ambassador Gerard Smith
and SALT I legal advisor John Rhinelander); Comment, The Role of Arms Control in
Strategic Nuclear Doctrine: SDI, MAD, and the ABM Treaty, 62 WASH. L. REv. 763,
764 (1987) (stating that the United States must choose between SDI and the ABM
Treaty).
6" There has been some controversy concerning the time period within which the
planned SDI tests could be conducted in accord with the original, restrictive interpreta-
tion of the ABM Treaty. Some officials (including Lt. Gen. Abrahamson, Director of
the SDI Organization of the Department of Defense) have suggested that the conflict
between the original interpretation and the planned testing program will not occur
until some years into the future; others (including then-Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle) have contended that the constraints of the original interpretation of the
ABM Treaty already may be impinging upon progress in SDI. See 133 CONG. REC.
52974 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Senator Nunn); see also 1985 SDI
Hearings, supra note 59, at 399 (testimony of Lt. Gen. Abrahamson) (stating that
development can proceed under the restrictive interpretation into the early 1990s);
HCFA SDI Hearings, supra note 68, at 70 (joint statement of John Pike and Thomas
K. Longstreth) (arguing that SDI development will be inconsistent with the ABM
Treaty); G. DUFFY, supra note 41, at 115 ("The prohibitions on development con-
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ingly, the Department of Defense, the Department of State Legal Ad-
viser, and ultimately in October 1985, the Reagan Administration as a
whole, propounded a "new interpretation" of the ABM Treaty - an
interpretation that was substantially more permissive regarding SDI
development and testing.70
Under the new interpretation, the Treaty's basic ban on the devel-
opment and testing of space-based and other mobile ABM systems and
components would apply only to "current" (that is, 1972-type) technol-
ogy. Space-based and other mobile "exotic" systems, based on "future"
(post 1972) ABM technology would be governed only by the provisions
applicable to fixed, land-based exotics. The net effect of the new inter-
pretation was that development and testing would be permitted, and
only deployment would be prohibited.1
Reaction to the new interpretation was profound and widespread,
and dealt with two related but distinct issues: the factual merits of the
new interpretation, and the constitutional authority for asserting it.72
1. Substance of the Reinterpretation Issue
Most of the senior members of the United States SALT I negotiat-
tained in the ABM Treaty would start at the part of the development process where
field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model."); T. LONGSTRETH,
J. PIKE & J. RHINELANDER, supra note 62, at 51 (providing a chart of scheduled SDI
tests that would raise compliance issues).
7* Several offices in different parts of the government played a role in shaping the
new interpretation in late 1984 and 1985. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 203-05
(statement of William Sims, former attorney advisor, Department of State); 1987
SFRC REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-27; 133 CONG. REC. S2974 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1987) (statement of Sen. Nunn); see also R. GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUS THE LAW:
THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY 2-9 (1987) (recounting history of
evolution of new interpretation).
7" The critical step for the new interpretation is to convert the definition of ABM
systems, contained in Article II of the Treaty, from a "functional" definition (in which
all equipment that could operate as an anti-ballistic missile system or component would
be covered by the Treaty) into a "limiting" definition (in which the Treaty applies only
to those types of ABM systems and components that are specifically mentioned in Arti-
cle II). Sofaer concedes that the original reading is "plausible," but asserts that it has
"serious shortcomings." See Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972, 1974 (1986).
72 Some argued that the "fundamental question" was solely whether SDI was in
the national security interest of the United States, and that the question of the legal
propriety of the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty was like arguing "about how
many angels dance on the head of a pin." Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 17 (state-
ment of Sen. Evans). Others responded that even if the United States did seek to pursue
SDI and to abandon the limitations of the ABM Treaty, it would be better to do so
"frontally, not by skirting the issue" with a reinterpretation. Id. at 17 (statement of
General Allison). See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES, OTA-ISC-254 (1985) (assessing technical and po-
litical merit of SDI).
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ing delegation denounced the new interpretation as a misreading of the
ABM Treaty's text and negotiations, which they said had produced a
more comprehensive ban on ABM systems. 3 Several leading Senators,
with recent access to the classified negotiating record, also criticized the
new interpretation as an attempt to rewrite history. 4 Academic experts
scrutinized the process of Senate advice and consent, as well as the sub-
sequent record of ABM Treaty implementation, finding scant evidence
to support the "broad" interpretation." The Soviet Union also denied
the historical accuracy of the new interpretation, and condemned it as
an attempt to subvert the ABM Treaty. 6
73 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison
(USAF-Ret.), member of the United States ABM Treaty negotiating delegation) (not-
ing that both United States and Soviet sides understood that the ABM Treaty prohib-
ited development and testing of mobile exotic systems); id. at 7-8 (statement of Ray-
mond L. Garthoff, Executive Secretary and senior advisor to the United States ABM
Treaty negotiating delegation) (asserting that statements made during the negotiating
process unambiguously support the traditional, restrictive interpretation); id. at 495-96
(joint letter from negotiators of the ABM Treaty supporting the traditional restrictive
interpretation as the correct one). Former President Richard Nixon, under whom the
ABM Treaty was negotiated, also has endorsed the original interpretation of the
Treaty, saying that it was this view of the Treaty which his administration presented to
the Senate in 1972. See Bunn, Nixon Supports Nunn on ABM Treaty, ARMS CON-
TROL TODAY, May 1988, at 21. But see Nitze, supra note 65, at 71 (arguing that SDI
is consistent with the ABM Treaty and noting that the Soviet position on the scope of
the Treaty has been inconsistent); Address by Paul H. Nitze, Interpreting the ABM
Treaty (Apr. 1, 1987), reprinted in Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 493 (same).
Nitze, the only former ABM Treaty negotiator to hold a position in the Reagan Ad-
ministration, is also the only one to endorse the broad interpretation of the ABM
Treaty.
7" Senator Nunn has stated repeatedly that the new interpretation is historically
inaccurate. See 133 CONG. REC. S6809-31 (daily ed. May 20, 1987); 133 CONG. REC.
S3090-95 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. S3171-73 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
1987); 133 CONG. REC. S2973-82 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987); see also Smith, Reinter-
pretation of ABM Treaty Hit, Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1986, at A8, col. 1 (reporting a
letter to Secretary of State Schultz from Senator Levin condemning the reinterpretation
as fatally flawed).
7' See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON INT'L ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS,
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE
TREATY INTERPRETATION DISPUTE 6-7 (1988) (stating that the negotiating history,
ratification debates and subsequent practice all support the traditional interpretation);
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5, at 1957-69 (arguing that neither the Treaty text,
negotiating record, nor subsequent practice support the Reagan Administration's rein-
terpretation); Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM
Treaty Conflict, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 34-38, 46-52 (1987) (arguing that the rein-
terpretation is legally deficient and an undesirable way out of the ABM/SDI conflict);
Klema, supra note 5, at 156-65 (applying the principles of treaty interpretation estab-
lished by the Vienna Convention to the ABM Treaty).
71 See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 58 (statement of Sen. Nunn) (quot-
ing statement of then Soviet Chief of General Staff Marshall Akhromeyev, in support
of the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty); id. at 410-11 (1983 interview
with Soviet official regarding SDI and the ABM Treaty); R. GARTHOFF, supra note
70, at 85-88 (noting the numerous Soviet statements since October 1985 that reaffirm
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The Reagan Administration, nonetheless, continued to assert that
the new interpretation was legally correct and supported by the ABM
Treaty record. 7 The State Department Legal Adviser identified what
he considered to be numerous "ambiguities" - in the Treaty's text, the
negotiating record, the Senate's legislative history, and the parties' sub-
sequent practice - which, he asserted, cast doubt upon the 1972 un-
derstandings of the Treaty's accomplishments. 78 However, the Admin-
istration conceded that at least for the interim, it would comply - as a
policy, rather than as a legal matter - with the constraints of the
"original" interpretation.7
the traditional interpretation and reject the Reagan Administration position); Ver-
eshchetin, Issues Related to Current U.S. and Soviet Views of the Treaty: A Soviet
Jurist's Perspective, in THE ABM TREATY: To DEFEND OR NOT TO DEFEND?,
supra note 62, at 105; Voas, ABM Treaty Interpretation: The Soviet View, in CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, OFFICE OF SENIOR SPECIALISTS, REPORT 85-1020,
at 5 (Oct. 25, 1985). But see Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 38-39 (statement of
Senator Wilson) (Soviets originally favored broad interpretation, but changed to the
narrow interpretation when they realized that the United States could embark on a
technological advance in ABM systems to their detriment); Kassel, Soviet Research and
Development of Directed-Energy Weapons, in THE ABM TREATY: To DEFEND OR
NOT TO DEFEND?, supra note 62, at 75 (discussing Soviet research concerning SDI
equivalents); Sofaer, supra note 71, at 1985 n.37 (Soviets made few statements about
scope of ABM Treaty until United States announced SDI, and even thereafter, Soviets
did not promptly and consistently claim that SDI was a violation of the Treaty).
Other states, including important United States allies, were hesitant about the new
interpretation, or opposed to it. See R. GARTHOFF, supra note 70, at 3, 16; see also
NATO Defense and the INF Treaty: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1988) [hereinafter NATO Defense Hearings]
(comments of Senator Levin). Some have since supported it. See 1985 SDI Hearings,
supra note 59, at 366 (statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle) (sur-
veying allies' and other states' attitudes toward participation in SDI research); cf.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE OR-
GANIZATION, supra note 65, Appendix B (describing consultations with allies).
7 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 119 (statement of Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard N. Perle); HFAC ABM Hearings, supra note 56, at 200-212 (Analy-
sis of United States and Soviet Analysis of United States and Soviet Post-negotiation
Public Statements Interpreting the ABM Treaty's Application to Future Systems, sub-
mitted by Judge Sofaer in response to a question posed during the Hearing); Sofaer,
The ABM Treaty, reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S6,623-63 (daily ed. May 19, 1987)
(Part I: Treaty Language and Negotiating History), 133 CONG. REC. S6,663-91 (daily
ed. May 19, 1987) (Part II: Ratification Process) and 133 CONG. REC. S12,181-84
(Part III: Subsequent Practice) [hereinafter Sofaer, ABMT Reports]. The Department
of Defense began referring to the "broad interpretation" simply as the "legally correct
interpretation," abbreviated to "LCI," see Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 172 (state-
ment of Professor Abram Chayes); id. at 470 (statement of Richard Perle), and in-
formed the Soviet delegation in Geneva of this view. See Morrison, ABM Tightrope, 19
NAT'L J. 1752, 1752 (1987).
78 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 31 (statement of Senator Wilson) (United
States negotiators in 1972 attempted to obtain Soviet agreement to ban future types of
ABM systems, but the Soviet delegation consistently declined); see also Sofaer, supra
note 71, at 1972.
71 See, e.g. Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 475 (statement of Richard N. Perle,
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More recently, Congress declared its support of the original inter-
pretation, by mandating in the Fiscal Year 1988-89 National Defense
Authorization Act that no funds could be used for SDI tests other than
those previously announced - tests that Congress and the Executive
already had determined would not contravene the original interpreta-
tion of the Treaty."0
2. Process of the Reinterpretation Issue
At the same time that the factual or substantive accuracy of the
new interpretation was scrutinized, its legitimacy under the Constitu-
tion also came under fire, with many critics challenging the Executive's
authority to implement any such alteration in the established meaning
of a treaty.81
The first return salvo from the Reagan Administration came in
March 1987, when Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, testified to a joint hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations and
Judiciary Committees that: "When [the Senate] gives its advice and
consent to a treaty, it is to the treaty that was made, irrespective of the
explanations [the Senate] is provided.""2
Assistant Secretary of Defense) (affirming that the President decided that SDI program
need not be structured to approach the boundaries of the broad interpretation, but re-
serving the right to restructure the program in the future); 1985 SDI Hearings, supra
note 59, at 141-42 (testimony of Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Adviser)
("[N]otwithstanding our belief in the merits of the broader interpretation, the President
has decided to pursue the SDI Program as currently structured, which can be accom-
modated within the confines of the restrictive interpretation . . . ."); HFAC ABM
Hearing, supra note 56, at 38 (comments of Ambassador Paul Nitze) (stating there is
no evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union has violated the restrictive
definition of the ABM Treaty); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STRATE-
GIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 65, Appendix D (describing
"the existing process for ensuring compliance with . . . the ABM Treaty").
80 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub.
L. No. 100-180, § 225, 101 Stat. 1019, 1056 (1987). As a compromise between the
Congress and the White House, this legislation does not explicitly state that the SDI
program is to be confined to activities that are consistent with the original interpreta-
tion of the ABM Treaty. Instead, it accomplishes the same objective by referring to an
earlier published description of planned SDI tests, which all participants agreed were,
in fact, consistent with the narrow interpretation. The Conference Committee report
then confined the Department of Defense SDI activities to that list. See H.R. REP. No.
446, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 594 (1987).
81 See Glennon, Interpreting "Interpretation": The President, the Senate, and
When Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty Making, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 913,
919 (1987) (concluding that when the President exceeds the bounds of good faith con-
struction, "his endeavor represents not construction or interpretation at all, but the
making of a new treaty").
82 Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 130. An incredulous Senator Biden, chairing
the hearing, asked the Legal Advisor to repeat his statement, and called it "absolutely
staggering." Id.
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In May of 1987, the Legal Adviser elaborated this view, conclud-
ing in a detailed study that a President is free to depart from a previ-
ously-held treaty interpretation unless three conditions had been met.
Under the Sofaer Doctrine, 8 the Executive's representation to the Sen-
ate can be relied upon only if it had been "generally understood,"
"clearly intended," and "relied upon" by the Senate during the treaty
ratification process.8 4 The Doctrine was then advanced as a founda-
tional justification for the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty, since
the original interpretation allegedly failed all three of these standards
with respect to the 1972 ratification process.8 5
The Senate, however, reacted vigorously in opposition to the
Sofaer Doctrine. 6 In March and April of 1987, the Senate Foreign
8 The Sofaer Doctrine has never been articulated with clarity as a principle of
constitutional law; it has arisen from the combination of Sofaer's testimony, see supra
notes 77-78 and accompanying text, the memorandum from the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, see Memorandum from Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State, Relevance
of Senate Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation, (Apr. 9, 1987) [hereinafter
OLC Memorandum] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review), and
subsequent letters from White House Counsel Arthur Culvahouse. See Letters from
White House Counsel Arthur B. Culvahouse to Senator Richard D. Lugar, (Mar. 17
& 22, 1988), reprinted in INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 443, 446; see also Biden &
Ritch, The End of the Sofaer Doctrine: A Victoryfor Arms Control and the Constitu-
tion, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1988, at 3, 5.
The Legal Advisor has stated that his March 1987 testimony regarding the non-
binding effect of Executive Branch statements, had been intended to be confined to the
observation that United States statements made during the ratification process were not
binding internationally, and had no effect upon the Soviet Union. See Sofaer, Letter to
the Editor, TIME, Apr. 27, 1987, at 10. The Legal Advisor also has written that "[tihe
President should give appropriate weight to Executive representations made to Con-
gress, and expectations developed by legislators, during the post-ratification period, in
determining and exercising his lawful discretion to interpret the ABM Treaty." Sofaer,
ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S12,184.
, See Chronology of Executive/ Senate Action on Treaty Interpretation, in INFT
REPORT, supra note 8, at 447; Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S12,184
(stating that the "President's powers to interpret treaties and to conduct foreign affairs
should not be limited absent clear indication that such limitations were specifically
intended").
In preparing his report, the Legal Advisor relied substantially upon a study con-
ducted by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, discussing the
respective roles of executive branch testimony and of Senators' statements in the legisla-
tive history of a treaty. See generally OLC Memorandum, supra note 83.
85 See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6,664.
86 See, e.g., Smith, Reinterpretation of ABM Treaty Hit, Wash. Post, Dec. 2,
1986, at A8, col. 1 (discussing Senator Levin's criticism of the Sofaer Doctrine). Some
in the Senate not only supported the Sofaer Doctrine, however, but articulated an even
stronger version of it. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 100-101 (statement of Sena-
tor Biden, quoting a letter from Senator Dole to the President) ("The views of the
Senate on interpretation of a treaty are legally irrelevant and in no way bind the Presi-
dent unless those views are expressed (1) formally and (2) at the time of the Senate's
decisions of advice and consent.").
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Relations Committee and Judiciary Committee held joint hearings on
the ABM Treaty and the Constitution,87 and the Foreign Relations
Committee later favorably reported the Biden Resolution,"8 affirming
that the President is constitutionally bound to adhere to all authorita-
tive interpretations offered during the ratification process until the Sen-
ate agrees to a change.8 9
D. The INF Treaty
The logical culmination of the ABM Treaty reinterpretation con-
troversy occurred during the spring of 1988, in the context of the ratifi-
cation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles.90 The INF Treaty provides for elimination of
the parties' stockpiles of ground-based missiles capable of reaching dis-
tances between approximately 300 and 3500 miles. 1
The INF Treaty attracted widespread, bipartisan support and on
May 27, 1988, the Senate gave its consent 2 to the Treaty by a vote of
ninety-three to five.93 One salient issue that surfaced during the Senate
debate, becoming a major perturbation in the ratification process, again
concerned the constitutional implications of the "reinterpretation" ques-
tion. 4 A number of prominent Senate Democrats, led by Senators
87 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1.
88 See S. Res. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Mar. 12, 1987), reprinted
in 1987 SFRC REPORT, supra note 4, at 117-20; id. at 37 (noting the committee's vote
to recommend favorably the resolution on May 19, 1987). The resolution was never
brought for consideration by the Senate as a whole, as the Congress worked instead on
the limitations on SDI funding. See Biden & Rich, supra note 83, at 8 n.3; supra note
80 and accompanying text.
89 The key provisions of the Biden Resolution stated that the meaning of a treaty
is "what the Senate understands the treaty to mean when it gives its advice and con-
sent," that the understanding of the Senate may be manifested by Senate approval and
acceptance or acquiescence in interpretations of the treaty communicated to the Senate
by the Executive Branch, and that the contents of the secret negotiating record, not
brought to the attention of the Senate, cannot be a part of the Senate's understanding of
the treaty. See S. Res. 167, supra note 88, § 2(2)(B)-(D)."
90 INF Treaty, supra note 8.
9' The INF Treaty will require the Soviet Union to dismantle 1836 missiles and
the United States to dismantle 859. It will result in the removal of 2200 nuclear war-
heads from the superpowers' inventories of deployed missiles. See INFT REPORT,
supra note 8, at 2-3, 56-61.
92 Partly in response to Senate prodding, United States and Soviet negotiators had
continued to work on the INF Treaty during the period between signature and ratifica-
tion, to resolve a series of ten verification-related questions, the details of which had
threatened to delay implementation of the agreement. See Gordon, U.S. and Soviets Say
Missile Pact Issue Has Been Resolved, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1988, Al, at col. 6;
Dewar, Senate Nears Debate on INF Treaty, Wash. Post, May 14, 1988, Al, at col. 5.
93 See 134 CONG. REC. S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988).
" See, e.g., Bedard, Senate Prohibits Reinterpretations, Nears Treaty OK, Wash.
Post, May 27, 1988, at A6, col. 5 (reinterpretation controversy is the "last major hurdle
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Byrd, Nunn, Pell, and Biden, sought reassurances from the Reagan
Administration that the INF Treaty would not be vulnerable to the
same type of reinterpretation that troubled the ABM Treaty.15
Secretary of State Shultz initially replied with a letter confirming
that the testimony offered by responsible Executive Branch officials
could be considered "authoritative"; that the Resolution of Ratification
need not explicitly incorporate the executive testimony; and that the
Reagan Administration would not depart from the INF Treaty inter-
pretations it had provided to the Senate. The Secretary declined, how-
ever, to describe the current testimony and interpretations as being
"binding" on future Presidents. 6
Dissatisfied with the scope of the Secretary's response, the Foreign
Relations Committee began to refine the "Biden Condition '9 7 (later
modified and sometimes referred to as the "Byrd Amendment"),98 to
express in the resolution of ratification the Senate's conviction that
competent Executive Branch testimony prior to ratification cannot be
facing the historic INF treaty"); The Treaty and Its Enemies, N.Y. Times, May 25,
1988, at A26, col. 1 (predicting that ratification would be unlikely unless the Adminis-
tration reassured the Senate as to the integrity of its role in treaty-making).
91 See Chronology of ExecutiveISenate Action on Treaty Interpretation, supra
note 84, at 447; Smith, Rift Widens as Biden and Pell Up the Ante, Wash. Post, Feb.
9, 1988, at A20, col. 1; Gordon, White House Criticizes Democrats for Threatening
Arms Pact Delay, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at Al, col. 4; Letter from Senators Byrd
and Nunn to George Schultz, Secretary of State (Feb. 5, 1988), reprinted in INFT
REPORT, supra note 8, at 447.
9 See Letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to Senator Nunn (Feb. 9,
1988), reprinted in INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 442. Some Senators were initially
hopeful that the Shultz letter would defuse the controversy; upon further analysis, how-
ever, the letter was determined to be consistent with the Sofaer Doctrine, as confirmed
by subsequent correspondence. See id. at 94; see also Gordon, 2 Senate Democrats End
Threat to Delay Pact, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1988, at A13, col. 1; Smith, Shultz INF
Letter Soothes 2 Senators, Angers 3rd, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1988, at A21, col. 1.
1 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 436 (reporting the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion containing the "Biden Condition."). The Biden Condition, introduced on behalf of
Senator Biden by Senator Cranston, was drafted in consultation with Professor Louis
Henkin, chief reporter for the American Law Institute's new Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2; INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 96.
The Biden Condition provided that the United States shall interpret the INF
Treaty in accordance with the understanding shared by the Executive and the Senate at
the time of Senate consent to ratification, that the common understanding is based upon
the text and the authoritative representations provided to the Senate by the Executive,
and that the United States shall not adopt a different interpretation except pursuant to
a treaty amendment or statute. See id. at 97. The terms of the Biden Condition were
not to be conveyed officially to the Soviet Union See id. at 99-100.
'8 Senator Byrd drafted alterations in the Biden Condition late in the advice and
consent period; the changes were relatively insubstantial, designed mostly as a parlia-
mentary tactic to protect against additional, hostile amendments. See Biden & Ritch,
supra note 83, at 7. Compare INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 436 (Biden Condition)
with 134 CONG. REC. S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988) (Byrd Amendment).
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disregarded for a subsequent unilateral reinterpretation. 9
In March 1988, White House Counsel Arthur Culvahouse sent
two letters to Senator Lugar, again asserting the Reagan Administra-
tion's position that even "authoritative" Executive Branch testimony is
not "binding," unless it satisfies the Sofaer Doctrine's tests of being
"generally understood," "clearly intended," and "relied upon" by the
Senate during the ratification process.' 00
Many in the Senate felt that the Sofaer Doctrine presented un-
palatable choices: if authoritative administration testimony was not au-
tomatically binding, then, in order to guarantee that any particular
point of interpretation would be reliable in the future, the Senate might
have to recite its understanding with a condition or other explicit decla-
ration in the resolution of ratification. There might be a great many
points where the Senate would want to insist upon entrenching a dura-
ble interpretation. Accordingly, dozens or even hundreds of such condi-
tions might be needed to expressly affix to the resolution of ratification
virtually everything that executive branch officials had asserted to the
Congress.'10
Moreover, under these circumstances, the Senate might addition-
ally feel obligated to scrutinize the entire classified negotiating record
itself, to ensure that the Executive Branch testimony fairly and accu-
rately represented the true nature of the United States-Soviet under-
standings. This would require elaborate inspection of voluminous, dis-
parate negotiating documents, a laborious and time-consuming function
that the Senate would not be well-equipped to perform."0 2
" The Biden Condition was designed "to reaffirm the long-standing practice and
long-standing principle that the 'shared understanding' of the Executive and the Senate,
as reflected in the Executive's formal representations, is indeed fully binding." INFT
REPORT, supra note 8, at 96.
100 See Letters from White House Counsel Arthur B. Culvahouse to Senator
Richard D. Lugar (Mar. 17 & 22, 1988), reprinted in INFT REPORT, supra note 8,
at 443, 446; see also 134 CONG. REC. S6774 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (statement of
Senator Nunn) (recapitulating events leading up to the drafting of the Biden Condi-
tion); Gordon, Democrats Clash With Reagan Over Arms Treaty, N.Y. Times, Mar.
20, 1988, at A3, col. 1 (noting Culvahouse's sharp rejection of Senate's position on
treaty interpretation).
101 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 62 (statement of Senator Nunn). As the
Senator stated: "Treaties so laden would sink under their own weight. It would be
extremely difficult to achieve bilateral agreements and virtually impossible for the
United States to participate in multilateral treaties." Id.; see also INFT REPORT,
supra note 8, at 105-06 (stating that the Biden Condition allows the Senate to rely
upon administration testimony without the cumbersome process of restating all of it).
102 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 62 (statement of Senator Nunn) (under
the Sofaer Doctrine, the Senate would feel compelled to request a complete record of
the negotiating history of a treaty in order to ensure that no secret understanding would
emerge later); cf. Specter, The Threat to the INF Treaty, N.Y. REv., Feb. 4, 1988, at
22 (arguing that the Senate should refuse to consider the secret negotiating record in
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Throughout the controversy concerning the reinterpretation condi-
tions that the Senate might attach to the INF Treaty, all participants
were fully conscious that more than one treaty was at stake.1"3 Al-
though the Biden Condition did not purport to have any retroactive
effect, (or, for that matter, to reach any future agreements besides the
INF Treaty),'" the controversy surrounding the ABM Treaty was also
clearly implicated. As a result, the difference between "authoritative"
and "binding" testimony became a surrogate for concerns about the
ABM Treaty, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the constitutional
balance of power between the Congress and the President.
Ultimately, on May 26, 1988, the Senate adopted the Biden Con-
dition to the INF Treaty Resolution of Ratification by a vote of sev-
enty-two to twenty-seven.' 0 5 The resolution stated that "the United
States shall interpret the Treaty in accordance with the common under-
standing of the Treaty shared by the President and the Senate at the
time the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification"; that the
common legislative-executive understanding of the Treaty was based in
part on the "authoritative representations which were provided by the
President and his representatives to the Senate and its Committees";
and that "the United States shall not agree to or adopt an interpreta-
tion different from that common understanding except pursuant to Sen-
ate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol, or the enact-
ment of a statute."' 06
President Reagan exchanged instruments of ratification of the INF
Treaty with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow, on June
evaluating the INF Treaty).
In the end, the Foreign Relations Committee, having access to the entire INF
Treaty negotiating record, decided to make no findings concerning the content of the
record, or concerning the accuracy of Executive Branch representations of it. The Com-
mittee determined that it should avoid "institutionalizing" the procedure of detailed
Senate scrutiny of the record. In making the point that the Senate was relying directly
upon the Executive Branch's presentations regarding the content of the INF Treaty,
the Senate indicated that it deliberately would refrain from officially double checking
the consistency between the negotiating record and the President's portrayal of it. See
INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 100-01.
In presenting the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the State Department
had declassified selected portions of the negotiating record and had made the entire
record (or the portions of it that could be collected) available to the Senate. See gener-
ally Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77.
103 See Biden & Ritch, supra note 83, at 8; Smith, supra note 5, at A17, col.1;
Smith, Dispute Threatens INF Treaty, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1988 at Al, col. 6.
104 See, e.g., INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 106-07 (noting that the Biden Con-
dition is not dispositive of ABM Treaty reinterpretation dispute because factual ques-
tion remains regarding the asserted ambiguity of the ABM Treaty and its record).
105 See 134 CONG. REC. S6724 (daily ed. May 26, 1988); Biden & Ritch, supra
note 83, at 7.
106 134 CONG. REc. S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988).
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1, 1988. On June 10, President Reagan sent a letter to the Senate,
officially denying the power of the Biden Condition. The President
stated that he could not "accept any diminution claimed to be effected
by such a condition in the constitutional powers and responsibilities of
the Presidency. 1 0 7 He added that "the principles of treaty interpreta-
tion recognized and repeatedly invoked by the courts may not be limited
or changed by the Senate alone, and those principles will govern any
future disputes over interpretation of this Treaty."' ' The letter reiter-
ated a variant of the Sofaer Doctrine, that "Executive statements
should be given binding weight only when they were authoritatively
communicated to the Senate by the Executive and were part of the ba-
sis on which the Senate granted its advice and consent to ratifica-
tion." 109 The President added that his Administration had no intention
of diverging from the Senate's current understanding of the INF
Treaty, so the difference in asserted powers would have no practical
significance. 10
In response, Senator Byrd argued that the President's objections to
the conditions of the Resolution of Ratification had come too late, say-
ing, "[t]he President accepted the condition when he exchanged the in-
struments of ratification." ' Senator Nunn added that, "The Treaty,
including this Condition, is now the supreme law of the land. And the
President can no more change it with a letter than he can change any
other law with a letter."1 12
The result of these exchanges is an impasse, with neither side giv-
ing ground on the specifics of the INF Treaty or on the more general
questions of treaty interpretation and the Sofaer Doctrine. Conse-




"I Strobel, INF Treaty Provision Triggers Reagan Balk, Wash. Times, June 13,
1988, at A6, col. 2. A subsequent response from Senator Pell, Chair of the Foreign
Relations Committee, emphasized that with the Biden Condition, the Senate was seek-
ing to preserve the Constitution, not to alter it. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 83, at 7-
8.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report on the INF Treaty had noted
that:
[T]he President may not act upon the Senate's consent without honoring
this Condition. Nothing that he or his Administration does, by statement
or action, whether before or after the act of ratification, can alter the bind-
ing effect of any condition which the Senate places upon its consent to
treaty ratification. If the President brings the INF Treaty into force, the
Condition takes effect.
INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 100.
112 Smith, President Disputes Hill on Treaties, Wash. Post, June 11, 1988, at
All, col. 1.
19891
1380 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
quently, the issue may be dormant, but only until the next treaty or
controversy is debated. In Part II and III, I will try to establish the
principles and mechanics of a better regime for resolving the deadlock.
II. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
We begin our search for a better approach to treaty interpretation
by developing a framework of general principles from international law
and United States constitutional law. x13 One should note at the outset
that very little is clear in this field. Experiential guidance is almost
non-existent," 4 as is court precedent. There is, accordingly, an unfortu-
nate tendency for one's impressions of the legal principles to be clouded
by judgments about the underlying policy choices."'
... These two legal systems overlap more than is often realized. Some observers
tend to focus on only one of the two legal aspects when analyzing treaty interpretation.
See Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071 (1985). State Department Legal Adviser
Abraham Sofaer's 1987 testimony regarding the Biden Resolution illustrates the impor-
tance and the difficulty of mastering the relationship between the concerns of interna-
tional and domestic law. See supra note 83. Time magazine ran a story critical of
Sofaer's celebrated remark that: "When [the Senate] gives its advice and consent to a
treaty, it is to the treaty that was made, irrespective of the explanations it is provided."
Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 130. In response, Sofaer sent a letter to the editor
asserting that his comment had been intended to refer only to the international, not the
domestic, effect of Senate action. He wrote: "My testimony, however, was addressed to
the effect of the Senate's ratification record on international obligations toward the
other party to a treaty, not the obligations of the President toward the Senate under the
U.S. constitutional structure." Sofaer, Letter to the Editor, supra note 83, at 10.
124 See 1987 SFRC REPORT, supra note 4, at 48 ("The Committee is aware of no
instance in which a treaty was reasonably supposed by the Senate, when it consented to
ratification, to mean one thing, and it was argued later by the Executive to mean some-
thing altogether different."); see also Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 74 (discussion
between Senator Adams and Senator Nunn) (no known precedent of executive reinter-
pretation of provisions fundamental to a treaty); id. at 90 (statement of Professor Louis
Henkin) (same). But see id. at 92 (statement of Senator Helms) ("I say to you that
there have been a number of treaties where the administration has interpreted them
differently down the line, and I did not hear any hue and cry about it."); id. at 94
(statement of Senator Pell) (agreeing with Senator Helms and providing the example of
reinterpretations of treaties with the American Indians).
"15 See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 71, at 1972 ("Many people have such intense
attitudes toward SDI that they are unable or unwilling to treat questions of this
Treaty's interpretation as other than a reflection of political ideology or strategic pur-
pose."); cf. Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 221 (discussion among Senator Biden,
Senator Pell, and Sidney N. Graybeal, former ABM Treaty negotiator) (noting that
Mr. Graybeal is one of the very few people who support the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive, yet oppose the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty).
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A. International Law Principles
International law is, in many respects, an underdeveloped system,
lacking both the comprehensiveness, and the obvious enforcement mech-
anisms available in the domestic law of advanced states. Skeptics have,
not surprisingly, raised questions about its effectiveness."1
The modern system of international law, however, is far from nu-
gatory. It embraces and promotes certain important shared principles,
and consistently affects the way countries act and communicate in the
international arena. It further provides a network of standards, as well
as mechanisms for resolving disputes regarding international treaty
obligations.1 1 7
For our purposes, four fundamentals of international law are di-
rectly relevant to the reinterpretation controversy, and serve as essential
starting points for building a workable interpretation framework.
1. State sovereignty requires that the treaty that binds is the treaty
that was negotiated and ratified.
A fundamental precept of international law is the concept that a
sovereign state cannot ordinarily be bound to a treaty without its ex-
plicit assent;1"" an international agreement may not lawfully bind, or
alter the bonds upon, a state against its will. 19 This means that the
international implications of the terms of the ABM Treaty or of the
INF Treaty are relatively enduring.
As a result of this precept, the ABM Treaty or INF Treaty that
obligates the signatories is the treaty on which their minds originally
met, and for which they exchanged signatures, and later instruments of
"1 See, e.g., D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. U.L. REv.
1293, 1293 (1985) (questioning the status of international law as "true law," "quasi-
law," or "near law").
117 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at 16-17 ("International law is law like
other law, promoting order, guiding, restraining, regulating behavior. States, the princi-
pal addressees of international law, treat it as law, consider themselves bound by it,
attend to it with a sense of legal obligation and with concern for the consequences of
violation.").
118 See Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (French Republic v. Turkish Republic), 1927
P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) (international law emanates from the free will
of states, and "[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be
presumed").
119 See id.; Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6671. A state can use a
variety of mechanisms to manifest its assent to a treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra
note 2, arts. 11-17. A state may not invalidate a treaty on the grounds that its consent
was given in violation of its own domestic processes, unless that violation of domestic
law was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance. See id., art. 46;
ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 52-55.
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ratification. The only internationally binding treaty is the one that the
parties created at the time of ratification. This is true even if one or
both later change their minds about what they could, or should, have
agreed to during negotiations. Subsequent activities, of course, can serve
as valuable evidence of what the parties originally did agree to, and can
thereby aid the interpretation process, but they are insufficient to alter
the basic textual obligations of either party.120
As a matter of international law, therefore, any United States
treaty interpretation - whether "new" or "old" - is not binding on
the Soviet Union. As a sovereign state the Soviet Union has the a priori
right to determine (as does the United States) the extent to which it is
willing to agree to any set of constraints upon itself. Neither party's
subsequent unilateral statements, legislative records, or individual ac-
tions could alter the text or change the terms of the treaty; any effective
amendment of the agreement always requires the affirmative action of
both parties. 21
In a crude sense, the analogy to domestic agent/principal law
might be illustrative. In the usual circumstance, if an agent, armed with
apparent authority to speak for a principal, makes an agreement within
the scope of delegated authority, the principal may be bound by its
terms, even if the principal doesn't like it. A fortiori, if the principal
has ratified the agreement prior to its entry into force, the principal
will be bound, even if the agent obtained the principal's concurrence by
deceit. 22 The principal has a cause of action against the disloyal agent,
but the innocent third party still gets the benefit of the bargain that was
120 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 403 (statement of Arthur W. Rovine,
former State Department Assistant Legal Advisor).
121 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 39-40; RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, § 334; see also Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Senator Biden)("We cannot change the rules in the middle of the game simply by ordering lawyers of
the State Department to find some loophole, as if they were high-paid counsel to some
tycoon who wants to welsh on a bad deal.").
It is ironic that some on the political right, who have favored a "strict construc-
tion" of the Constitution and of major legislation, have come to advocate an expansive
power of treaty reinterpretation, allowing considerable deviation from the understand-
ings of the creators of the ABM Treaty. Conversely, some on the political left, who
oppose an exclusive focus on the "original intention" of the drafters of the Constitution,
now favor that close fealty to the authors of the ABM Treaty. See Joint Hearings,
supra note 1, at 83 (statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe);Joint Hearings, supra
note 1, at 79-80 (statement of Professor Gordon Brewster Baldwin) (arms control
treaty is not like contracts or like other, more detailed and narrow treaties - it re-
quires continuing negotiations, not.fixed and indelible meaning); see also Perry, Judi-
cial Activism, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 69-73 (1984) (discussing the definition
of "interpretation" and role of Judiciary regarding Constitution).
12 Under certain circumstances, fraud or coercion may provide a basis for invali-
dating an international agreement. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 49-51;




In this context, the analogy suggests that the President (as agent)
signs the treaty, and the Senate (as principal) consents to its ratifica-
tion. Even if the President misrepresents the content of the agreement,
the innocent third party (the Soviet Union) is entitled to rely upon the
agreement that was duly negotiated. The problem in domestic political
terms is how to convert the principal's hypothetical cause of action
against the unfaithful agent, and transform it into something that is
politically reliable. This is, however, a question of domestic law and
politics, not of international obligations." 4
2. Treaties are to be interpreted in good faith.
The basic "good faith" norm of treaty interpretation is reflected in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 25 and in
the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States. 2 ' The principle and its correlate, that
the interpretation is to be "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
123 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 311, reporters' note 4 ("Decisions of the
Permanent Court of International Justice support the rule that a state is bound by
apparent authority where lack of authority is not obvious to outside parties .... ");
see also Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 434 (letter from Professor Louis Henkin)
(suggesting analogy to principal/agent law).
If the other state was not "innocent," but procured the treaty through the corrup-
tion or coercion of the agent, then the treaty may be voidable. See Vienna Convention,
supra note 2, arts. 50-51.
124 See Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 115, 121 (1984) (noting that even if
President acted ultra vires in agreeing to tax provisions of Panama Canal Treaty, the
United States is bound by it), rev'd, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), affid sub nom
O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986); see also Joint Hearings, supra note 1,
at 63 (statement of Senator Nunn) (if the President were to sign one contract with the
Soviet Union, and a different contract with the Senate, there would be "profoundly
disturbing constitutional implications, to say the least"); cf id. at 73 (statement of Sen-
ator Biden) (comparing treaty creation to the sale of a house, in which both co-owners
must sign the contract of sale and no secret arrangements between one co-owner and
the purchaser will be valid against the other co-owner unless reflected in the contract).
Of course, deliberate presidential misleading of Congress might be grounds for other
political or legal sanctions, including perhaps impeachment.
125 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31. The Vienna Convention was
concluded on May 23, 1969 and entered into force on January 27, 1980. The United
States signed the Vienna Convention, but has not ratified it. Nevertheless, the Treaty is
considered an authoritative statement regarding the law of treaties, and many of its
provisions are binding upon all states, since they are declaratory of customary interna-
tional law. See ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 41; see also E. YAMBRUSIC,
TREATY INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND REALITY 169 (1987) (discussing principles
of treaty interpretation in international practice).
12 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 321.
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object and purpose,"12 7 are essential ingredients in the creation of a
viable pattern of international public and private business. Reference to
"good faith" does not by itself resolve all treaty interpretation ques-
tions, but does suggest certain standards.12
The Vienna Convention and the Restatement further specify the
sources to be consulted regarding treaty interpretation matters - in-
cluding first and foremost, the actual text in question. Any associated
instruments, subsequent practices, or other such materials, are also re-
viewed, in accord with a rough hierarchy established by international
law.1
29
It is important to note that international agreements are character-
ized by an inherent degree of ambiguity and indeterminacy that makes
interpretation challenging. ° While every word of the treaty text has
127 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, § 325; cf. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (arguing that obliga-
tions of a treaty should be liberally construed, so as to effect the apparent intention of
the parties); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 128 (1928) (declaring that accepted
principles require the court to give the terms of a treaty a liberal rather than a narrow
interpretation); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to
be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one
restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the
latter is to be preferred.").
12I Perhaps the most basic principle of the law of treaties is the maxim pacta sunt
servanda (treaties must be kept). See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 26. This
principle requires that international obligations take precedence over contrary national
laws and that statutory, or even constitutional, barriers to a treaty are insufficient to
excuse a party's non-performance.
129 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 31-32; RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, § 325. United States jurisprudence departs somewhat from that of the international
community as reflected in the Vienna Convention. That is, the Vienna Convention
places a special primacy upon the "ordinary meaning" of the text of a treaty, requiring
a finding that the text is obscure or ambiguous before "supplementary means of inter-
pretation" such as the negotiating record of the treaty (traveaux preparatoires) may be
consulted. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 32; Jurisdiction of the European
Commission of the Danube (Galatz v. Braila), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 14, at 31
(Dec. 19, 1926).
United States courts, on the other hand, are generally more concerned with the
parties' intentions, and more willing to look outside the four corners of the treaty docu-
ment in order to adduce its meaning. See, e.g., Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. at 294 (court
may look beyond the words of a treaty to ascertain its meaning); Coplin v. United
States, 761 F.2d 688, 691 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (court should look beyond literal language
of treaty and examine diplomatic exchanges in order to adduce the parties' intentions),
affd, 479 U.S. 27 (1986); RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 325, comment g. But see
Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 396 (statement of Abram Chayes and Antonia H.
Chayes) (differences between United States practice and international law practice re-
garding the treatment of negotiating history in treaty interpretation are relatively mi-
nor, a matter of nuance rather than a fundamental divergence).
30 See, e.g., HFAC ABM Hearings, supra note 56, at 23 (statement of Ambassa-
dor Gerard Smith) ("It would be a unique episode in international negotiations to have
a completely unambiguous record, especially in a bargaining process requiring 2
years."); G. DUFFY, supra note 41, at 2 (balancing conflicting interpretations of agree-
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received the assent of the parties, there will always linger a variety of
potential problems: unanticipated technological advances; inadvertent
(or deliberate) loopholes; and, in the crush of negotiations over critical
issues, simple failure to think through all the eventualities of all the
possible details."' 1
The negotiating history can be an important contributor in at-
tempting to adduce the parties' intentions, importing into any textual
ambiguities a reflection of their mutual object and purposes." 2 But the
negotiating history of a treaty is usually far less tangible and less relia-
ble than, for instance, the legislative history of a congressional enact-
ment. 3 This is because, in the international arena, there are ordina-
rily no "recording secretary," no official minutes, and no agreed
committee reports to convey consensus understandings. 3
The negotiating history of an arms control treaty is particularly
uneven and incomplete. It consists principally of the following ele-
ments: 1) a relatively small number of formal "plenary statemients" that
are read and later exchanged by ambassadors in order to introduce ma-
jor elements or to signal important changes in negotiating posture; 35 2)
draft treaty texts prepared during the course of negotiations; 3 ' and 3) a
ments is difficult in the international sphere).
131 See. e.g., Joint Hearing, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Senator Thurmond)
("Diplomatic negotiations are ambiguous by nature. This should be expected when a
country whose legal traditions are based on English common law negotiates with a
totalitarian dictatorship to achieve diametrically opposite ends."); see also 133 CONG.
REc. S3172 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1987) (statement of Senator Nunn) (acknowledging
that there are ambiguities in the record of the ABM Treaty and wishing that the nego-
tiators had achieved a higher level of clarity and precision in drafting, but noting, "[o]f
course, as we in the Senate well know, writing clear law is a worthy goal but one not
easily attained.").
12 Here again, there is a slight, but perhaps significant, difference in interpreta-
tion methodology between international and United States courts. The Vienna Conven-
tion focuses attention on "the ordinary meaning" of the terms of the text, in light of
their object and purpose. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31. Most United
States courts, however, would look first at the intention of the parties, with the ordi-
nary meaning of the words being one factor useful in adducing their intentions. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 325, reporter's note 4.
113 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 198 (statement of Antonia Chayes, for-
mer Undersecretary of the Air Force) (noting that a negotiating record is very extensive
and confusing, "not at all neat like the legislative record before the Senate"); 133
CONG. REc. S6810 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Senator Nunn) (the negoti-
ating record "materials simply do not compare in quality to the debates and reports
normally relied upon for interpretation of legislation").
1'4 See R. GARTHOFF, supra note 70, at 30 n.4; McNeill, U.S.-USSR Nuclear
Arms Negotiations: The Process and the Lawyer, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 52, 56 (1985).
... A plenary meeting is the most formal device for the arms control negotiations,
providing the occasion for important explanatory remarks and the tabling of proposed
texts. See McNeill, supra note 134, at 56.
... Typically, each delegation tables its own version of the text of each article of a
proposed treaty and, at some point, the respective versions are merged into a "joint
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vast quantity of unilateral "memoranda of conversations" ("mem-
cons") 1 7 that are written after the fact by members of the delegation to
summarize a long or short, formal or informal, discussion held with a
member of another delegation." 8
The corpus of the negotiating record - which grows irregularly
and inconsistently over the years, reflecting the piecemeal fits and starts
of the negotiations3 9 - is itself, therefore, often less clear, as well as
harder to assemble and to index,"04 than we would like. Despite the
inadequacies of the various elements of the record, international law
dictates the order and relative weight to be given to sources when a
question of treaty interpretation arises.
3. The critical time for measuring the parties' intentions and
understandings is the time at which the treaty is made.
A third principle may be derived from the first two: when inspect-
ing the parties' interpretations or understandings regarding their new
treaty obligations, international law directs foremost attention to the
time when the treaty was "made," that is, the time when the instru-
ments of ratification were exchanged."'
It is this period that represents the parties' critical "meeting of the
draft text" reflecting areas of agreement and disagreement. See id. at 59.
137 Delegation members encounter members of other nations' delegations quite
frequently and report back to their national capitals via memcons regarding the sub-
stance of the conversations. See id. at 57. There is a slogan that "no one ever loses in
his own memcons," meaning that these unilateral reports, never seen or vetted by the
public or by members of the other delegation, are inherently one-sided accounts of the
conversations. See 133 CONG. REc. S6810 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Sen-
ator Nunn).
18 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 117 (statement of Senator Biden)
(describing the negotiating record of a treaty as "an amalgam - of indeterminate size
- of translators' notes, memcons, and internal memorandums"); see also 133 CONG.
REc. S6810 (daily ed. May 20, 1987) (statement of Senator Nunn) (negotiating record
is "a variety of documents of uneven quality").
139 See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 377 (statement of Professor Abram
Chayes) (treaty negotiations extend over many months, negotiating positions shift, and
drafters have to develop varying language, so no one piece of the history, taken out of
context, can reveal the treaty's meaning).
140 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 117 (statement of Senator Biden); id. at
151 (colloquy between Senator Kerry and Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal
Adviser); id. at 198 (statement of Antonia Chayes, former Undersecretary of the Air
Force); see also Glennon, supra note 81, at 917 (no guaranty that even now the gov-
ernment could assemble a complete set of the disjointed documents constituting the ne-
gotiating record of the ABM Treaty).
141 The Vienna Convention reflects a variety of mechanisms through which a state
may express its intention to be bound to a treaty: upon signature, upon exchange of
later instruments, and more. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 11-17. As
noted below, infra note 143 and accompanying text, virtually all important agreements
regarding arms control are designed to be effective only upon ratification.
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minds" because the negotiators' earlier understandings (including even
those held at the time of signature of the treaty) may be modified by
intervening events, such as either state's domestic process of treaty ap-
proval. Conversely, the subsequent positions of either side are inher-
ently unilateral and are often affected in a self-serving fashion by the
emerging controversy itself - they do not reflect a mutually-agreed
resolution of any questions.
This is not to suggest that an international agreement is a perma-
nent straightjacket. Indeed, the parties to a treaty may freely modify it
by a subsequent amendment or by mutually-agreed practice.14 But un-
til they elect to do so by consensus, the treaty that was made - as
evident in their shared interpretation of it at that time - remains bind-
ing under international law.
4. International law contemplates a variety of treaty-making
processes.
International law affords a great deal of freedom in most aspects
of treaty-making, so countries may adapt the procedures and content of
the documents to serve their foreign policy objectives and still be faith-
ful to their peculiar domestic political processes. For example, negotiat-
ing delegations may be established in a variety of ways at differing
levels of authority. Similarly, the parties may write a treaty that is
designed to come into force immediately upon signature, or they may
require some form of prior review by home authorities. 43 In the same
way, the parties may intend a treaty to be "self-executing," creating
international and domestic legal obligations as soon as it enters into
force. Or, conversely, they may intend the treaty obligations to commit
the parties only to undertake other future action without which the
treaty is ineffective as municipal law." Treaties with any combination
142 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 115, comment d.
143 See id.; Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 11-17. Modern arms control
agreements virtually always require subsequent political approval and ratification. The
role of the United States Senate, as an independent check upon the actions of the Exec-
utive, is unusual in international practice. See N. CALVO-GOLLER & M. CALVO, supra
note 33, at 4. In the Soviet Union, for example, domestic ratification is a mere formal-
ity after the executive has made its decision. Id. at 87, 145-79.
144 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). The Court stated:
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty ad-
dresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legisla-
ture must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court.
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of these characteristics are acceptable under international law. Inter-
preting a treaty on these matters is essentially a question of discovering
or deducing the parties' intentions in the particular document in
question.
International law has also created a jurisprudence surrounding
"reservations." A reservation is a nation's unilateral attempt, after the
negotiations, to modify the terms or import of the treaty. 14 5 Almost any
type of reservation may be registered at the time of signing or ratifying
a treaty, provided that reservation is neither prohibited by the treaty
nor incompatible with its object and purpose. 46 The Vienna Conven-
tion specifies detailed procedures for registering a reservation 47 and ex-
plicates the legal effects of reservations, objections to reservations, and
acceptances of reservations.148 The network of resulting obligations may
become quite complex in a multilateral treaty, but conceptually, inter-
Id. at 314; see also ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 66-70; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 2, § 111 comment h. A treaty may be partially self-executing. In some
instances (such as treaties imposing tax obligations or requiring the expenditure of
public funds), the United States Constitution would require provisions of an agreement
to be non-self-executing, so that congressional legislation would be required for imple-
mentation. See id., § 111, comments h, i.
Many provisions of modern arms control agreements are non-self-executing, and
subsequent legislation is contemplated. See, e.g., Biological Weapons Convention,
supra note 21, art. IV ("Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with
its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention,
within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control
anywhere.").
One of the controversial issues delaying United States ratification of the Genocide
Convention was the question of whether the Treaty would be considered self-executing.
The Foreign Relations Committee concluded that it would not be and also recom-
mended a declaration to underscore that point. See Constitutional Issues Relating to
the Proposed Genocide Convention: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 41 (1985) [hereinafter
GENOCIDE CONVENTION HEARINGS] (written responses of Professor John Norton
Moore); SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., INT'L CONVENTION ON THE PREVEN-
TION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 2, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1985) [hereinafter GENOCIDE CONVENTION REPORT].
111 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 19-23; RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, §§ 313-14; see also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 15-20 (written statement of the Organ-
ization of American States) (describing the legal effects of reservations and of objections
to reservations). The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as a unilateral statement
whereby a party to a treaty "purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna Convention, supra
note 2, art. 1 (d).
148 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 19; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2,
§ 313(1).
147 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 23.
"" See id., arts. 20-22; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 313-14.
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national law has no difficulty dealing with parties' contemporaneous
expressions of conflicting interpretations or understandings. 49
The foregoing analysis suggests that relevant standards of interna-
tional law permit the United States a substantial, but not unlimited,
range of freedom regarding the creation and enforcement of treaties.
International practice allows nations to shape their international obli-
gations largely as they see fit in order to serve the participants' shared
object and purposes without stultifying red tape. On the other hand, the
principles of international law are not infinitely malleable. In particu-
lar, no state is allowed to impose its will upon its negotiating partners,
and no state is authorized to effectuate unilateral changes in agreed
treaty terms. States "change their minds" with regularity in regard to
the wisdom and desirability of their international commitments, but
they may lawfully alter the existing treaties only by mutual consent.
B. Constitutional Principles of Treaty Interpretation
1. The Supremacy Clause establishes that treaties and statutes are
equivalent under the Constitution.
Article VI 5 states that the Constitution is superior to either legis-
lation or treaty15 and also provides that the latter two types of instru-
ments are of equal dignity. In the event of a conflict between legislation
and a treaty, the more recent document will prevail. 52 If a statute is
14 See Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of
State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 372-73 (1980).
'go U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . ").
'51 See e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) ("[N]o agreement with a
foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Govern-
ment, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution. . .. The prohibitions of the
Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and
they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate com-
bined."); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that
[the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids."); L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 137-56 (1972).
In considering the controversial Genocide Convention, the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee concluded that there might be a conflict between the Treaty and the United
States Constitution and recommended a reservation to clarify that the obligations of the
Constitution would prevail. See GENOCIDE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 144, at
19-20. The minority commentators argued that this reservation was unnecessary, since
for purposes of domestic law, the Constitution would overrule a treaty in any event,
and the "self-judging" nature of the reservation was politically unwise. See id. at 30-
31.
12 See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (tariff treaty with
Great Britain superseded prior inconsistent statute); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
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subsequent to a treaty, for example, it can require the United States to
take actions that violate the treaty. 53 Conversely, if the treaty is second
in time, it can effectively supersede a prior inconsistent statute, at least
to the extent that the treaty is intended to be self-executing. 54 In addi-
tion, American domestic law can readily supplement the obligations of
a treaty, imposing tougher restrictions on the United States than those
compelled by our negotiating partners under the treaty. 55
U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (statute excluding aliens from United States takes precedence over
earlier treaty); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution
a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation. . . .but if the two are inconsistent, the last one in date will control the
other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.");
Head Money Case, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884) (congressional enactment can super-
sede a treaty).
13 The United States then would be liable internationally for breach of the
treaty's obligations and could not effectively assert as a defense the fact of domestic
process that mandated the violation. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 115, comment
b. Courts will attempt to avoid an interpretation of a statute that will conflict with
international law. See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243, 251-53
(1984) (treaty will not be deemed abrogated by subsequent legislation unless congres-
sional intent is clear); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains . . ).
14 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 115; see also Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (self-executing treaty modified statutory territorial limitations for
search and seizure of British vessels suspected of smuggling intoxicating liquors into the
United States); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907) (later treaty will not be
regarded as repealing an earlier statute by implication unless the two documents are
absolutely incompatible); United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103,
106-109 (1801) (a treaty is the supreme law of the land superseding incompatible
legislation).
16' These heightened constraints are not binding upon another nation unless it
unilaterally decides to follow suit. Moreover, they can be changed at will by the United
States without international law implications. As long as the United States complies
with its treaty obligations, other countries have no particular legal interest in whatever
additional constraints are self-imposed by legislation, court order, or any of the myriad
of other devices available for making domestic law in this country. See Joint Hearings,
supra note 1, at 127 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Ad-
viser). For example, the ABM Treaty, supra note 7, permitted the United States and
the Soviet Union to deploy two missile defense systems each. This was later reduced to
one site per country by a subsequent protocol. See Protocol to the ABM Treaty, supra
note 58, at 161. The Soviet Union has deployed, and periodically upgraded, its one
permitted site near Moscow. The United States, on the other hand, constructed, but
promptly deactivated and decommissioned, its one site near Grand Forks, North Da-
kota. See generally ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 14, at 144.
Sofaer told the Committee that:
These [committee reports) and the statements in the Senate in the ratifica-
tion proceedings are, in fact, purely domestic documents of no concern to
other parties except where, in a particular case, the U.S. Government acts
formally to communicate such matters to the other side. In such a case, an
interpretation communicated to the other party, while not binding, could
have probative weight in determining what the parties intend. . ..
Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 127; see also ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at
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The principles governing United States treaties will apply, with
substantially the same effect, to international agreements other than
treaties.' 56 "Executive agreements," whether fashioned by the Execu-
tive alone, pursuant to a prior treaty, or with the approval of the Con-
gress, have essentially the same status under both international and do-
mestic law as treaties."' 7 Even though their constitutional basis is
different, the two types of documents have become almost
interchangeable. 5 "
A final observation in this context is that international law,
55-56 (unilateral statements and declarations of intent not binding). But see Nuclear
Tests Case (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 269 (unilateral declarations by
France that it would discontinue atmospheric nuclear testing held to be legally bind-
ing); Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (same); N.
CALvO-GOLLER & M. CALVO, supra note 33, at 187 (noting that unilateral declara-
tions can create binding legal rights and obligations in some circumstances).
156 The Senate's advice and consent power affords it a special role in the evalua-
tion of treaties, but the House of Representatives also frequently expresses a great in-
terest, even when the international agreement does not come directly before it. See gen-
erally HFAC ABM Hearings, supra note 56, at 1 (meeting of House Subcommittee to
discuss executive policy with respect to the ABM Treaty); HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMM., AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS,
H.R. REP. 1324, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972) (response to executive request for House
recommendation of ABM Treaty).
157 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937); B. Altman & Co.
v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912); ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at
70-87 RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 303.
15 See Circular 175 Procedures: Treaties and Other International Agreements in
11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Chapter 700 (rev. ed. Oct. 25, 1974), reprinted in
ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 248-70 [hereinafter Circular 175]; L. HEN-
KIN, supra note 151, at 173-87. Executive agreements have become much more com-
mon than treaties. By 1983, the United States was party to 966 treaties and 6571
executive agreements. See ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 38-39.
The Case/Zablocki Act, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1982)), requires that all executive agreements be trans-
mitted to the Congress within 60 days of execution, to prevent the creation of "secret
agreements." See id.
One special aspect of United States law regarding executive agreements in the
field of arms control specifies that any steps "that will obligate the United States to
disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States"
may be taken only pursuant to the treaty power or to affirmative legislation of the
Congress. Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-297, § 33, 75
Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1982)). Where the Executive
concludes an international agreement (such as the SALT I Interim Agreement on Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms) in the form of an executive agreement, rather than a treaty, this
statute contemplates that the agreement is to be approved by a majority of each House
of Congress. It is arguable, of course, that the purported restrictions of this statute
would be invalidated as an unconstitutional attempt to impinge upon the President's
constitutional ability to conclude an executive agreement that limits the armed forces of
the United States, based upon the Executive's power to conclude "sole" executive
agreements. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 303, reporters' note 8. This question
has never been tested, however, because the only major arms control accord that was
cast as an executive agreement (the SALT I Interim Agreement) was submitted to both
Houses of Congress.
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whether produced by custom or by agreement of the United States, is
"incorporated" into American law.'59 Like treaties, customary interna-
tional law has come to be considered as "supreme" federal law, over-
ruling contrary state statutes as well as inconsistent prior congressional
enactments.' 60
2. There is a substantial, although not complete, deference to the
Executive in matters of international policy.
In recognition of the singular demands of international life, Amer-
ican jurisprudence has come to acknowledge a unique relationship
among the powers of the federal and state governments and within the
three branches of the national leadership. Ordinarily, the federal gov-
ernment is deemed to possess near total authority to speak for the na-
tion as a whole, and the President is customarily accorded unusual lati-
tude to speak for the federal government in the foreign policy sector.'
Under this arrangement, the President, as possessor of "the executive
power" under the Constitution,' 62 and as Commander in Chief,'6 3 has
extraordinary authority to act as the "sole organ"'6 4 of the United
States in dealings with other sovereigns.' 6 5
'5' See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d
Cir. 1980) (international customary law prohibiting torture is binding inside United
States).
10 See L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 221-24; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2,
§ 111. Customary international law is considered equivalent to federal common law of
the United States, cognizable in federal and state courts. See id., § 111, comment d,
reporters' note 3.
161 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (Constitution bars "an
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to
the President and to Congress"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937)
("In respect of ... our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such
purpose the State. . .does not exist."); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,
604-09 (1889) (national government has power to direct foreign affairs); L. HENKIN,
supra note 151, at 15 ("Foreign affairs are national affairs," and the national govern-
ment, not the states, conducts them). Under the Constitution, States of the United
States may not make treaties and may make "agreements" or "compacts" with other
nations only with the consent of Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3.
162 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
16$ See id., § 2, cl. 1.
164 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(quoting speech of Representative John Marshall).
I66 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-88 (1981); Belmont, 301
U.S. at 330. As the Belmont Court stated; "Governmental power over external affairs
is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect
of what was done here [settling claims with the Soviet Union], the Executive had au-
thority to speak as the sole organ of that government." Id.; see also Sullivan v. Kidd,
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Executive primacy does not require automatic and complete defer-
ence from the other branches in every controversy touching interna-
tional affairs. Both the Congress and the Judiciary have roles to play in
shaping the international affairs of the United States, and none of the
three branches can count on having "the last word" on these issues.1 6
Many of Congress's enumerated powers, such as the commerce
clause,167 the power to declare war 6 ", and the Senate's opportunity to
advise and consent to treaties, 6 ' concern foreign affairs. Moreover,
there are additional situations where Congress and the President share,
to some imprecisely-defined extent, the power to influence foreign
affairs.170
Justice Jackson's famous triptych in the 1952 Steel Seizure
Case... is still the leading expression of the potential overlap between
executive and legislative functions. 172 There, he identified three scena-
rios of varying shared powers between the Executive and Congressional
254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921) (noting that the Executive is charged with the supervision of
foreign affairs); A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
127-29, 376-79 (1976) (developing the historical basis for Presidential control over for-
eign affairs); Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284,
297-99 (1987) (noting that developments over the years have firmly established the
President's exclusive control over diplomacy).
188 See, e.g., ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 8-9 (describing steps in
making a treaty or executive agreement); id. at 25-28 (describing the evolution of the
treaty power during the Constitutional Convention). As Alexander Hamilton described
the foreign relations power:
The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and
to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor the executive. The quali-
ties elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign ne-
gotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in those transac-
tions; while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties
as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of
the legislative body in the office of making them.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888); see also A.
SOFAER, supra note 165, at 127-29, 376-79 (describing early practice of shared legisla-
tive and executive powers); THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra, at 401 (J. Jay) (entrust-
ing the President and the Senate with the treaty-making power reflects the desire that
treaties be formed by "those who best understand our national interests").
187 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
188 See id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
18 See id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
171 See L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 32 ("As they have evolved, the foreign
relations powers appear not so much 'separated' as fissured, along jagged lines indiffer-
ent to classical categories of governmental power: some powers and functions belong to
the President, some to Congress, some to the President-and-Senate; some can be exer-
cised by either the President or the Congress, some require the joint authority of
both.").
171 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (con-
curring opinion).
172 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981) (citing
Justice Jackson's tripartite analysis of executive power).
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Branches. 173 Treaty law is a classic example of Justice Jackson's sec-
ond category, the "twilight zone" of concurrent, uncertain executive
and legislative authority and shared functions.' 74 This overlap obtains
not only in the making of treaties, but also in their subsequent
interpretation.
a. Shaping Treaties
At the outset of the process of creating a new treaty, the President
clearly has the lead responsibility for conducting the international nego-
tiations, although the participation of members of Congress in this
phase seems to be increasing.'7 5 The action next shifts to the Senate,
which independently considers the treaty during the advice and consent
period, and may attach various conditions, including reservations that
may mandate renegotiation.' Once the Senate has given its consent,
173 First, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum . . . ." Youngstown Sheet & Tube,
343 U.S. at 635. Second, "[w]hen the President acts in the absence of either a Congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, . . . there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." Id.
at 637. Third, "[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely upon
only his own constitutional powers, minus any constitutional powers of Congress over
the matter." Id.
174 See id.
175 The modern practice of the Executive Branch regarding the negotiation of
treaties is outlined in Circular 175, supra note 158, at 248-70. The very early practice
under the Constitution was for the President to consult the Senate in detail about .pro-
posed treaty provisions and to solicit the Senate's advice on specific matters while the
negotiations were ongoing. This proved unsatisfactory since the legislative body as a
whole proved too cumbersome to provide timely, specific advice to the negotiations. See
ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 30-34; see also A. SOFAER, supra note 165, at
95-97 (discussing President Washington's decision to conduct negotiations without the
Senate's ongoing advice).
During the SALT II and START negotiations, various members of Congress
came to play roles as participants on the United States negotiating delegation, serving
as policy advisors and as legislators directing national policy. See, e.g., McNeill, supra
note 134, at 63-64 (suggesting that congressional involvement will grow in the future as
a result of the role played by members of the legislature in START and SALT II).
It also should be noted that the Senate plays another, indirect role in treaty negoti-
ation through the power to confirm presidential policy-making appointees, diplomats,
and arms control negotiators. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; 22 U.S.C. § 2567
(1982) (creating the position of Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Negotiations, with presidential appointment subject to Senate advice and consent).
178 A variety of mechanisms is available for the Senate to express itself regarding
the content of a treaty. An amendment is a proposed change in the text of the document
itself. A reservation is a qualification or stipulation that changes United States treaty
obligations without necessarily changing the text. An understanding is an interpretive
statement made for the purpose of clarifying or elaborating, rather than changing, the
provisions of the agreement. A declaration is a statement of the Senate's position or
opinion on matters related to the treaty, but not its specific provisions. The distinctions
[Vol. 137:1353
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
the President again must take the initiative in deciding whether to
"make" the treaty by exchanging the instruments of ratification. The
President may decline to ratify the agreement if, for example, he de-
cides that the Senate's declarations or other actions regarding it are
unacceptable.1
77
Once the treaty has been made, the President, as Chief Executive,
bears the responsibility for faithfully implementing it.?17  Congress,
however, controls the purse-strings, as well as the power to pass neces-
sary implementing legislation, 17  and the courts also have an integral
among these four devices may be elusive; the effect of the particular proviso, rather
than its label, is what matters. See ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 109-12;
SFRC SALT II REPORT, supra note 35, at 34; see also L. HENKIN, supra note 151,
at 382 n.31 (noting that the Senate sometimes refers collectively to "understandings and
reservations" without specifying which is which).
The Senate sometimes has made fine discriminations among the various types of
provisos. For example, in ratifying the Genocide Convention, the Senate gave its con-
sent subject to two reservations, five understandings, and one declaration. See GENO-
CIDE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 144, at 15. "Each type of proviso makes a
different statement about the international legal obligation the United States would
assume by ratifying the Genocide Convention; each can also have different conse-
quences for the relationship between the United States and the other parties to the
Convention." Id.
During hearings concerning the INF Treaty, some witnesses urged the Senate to
consider reservations that would require renegotiation of the Treaty, rather than simply
voting yes or no on so-called "killer amendments" which could scuttle the entire docu-
ment. See NATO Defense Hearings, supra note 76, at pt. 3, 142 (comments of former
Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle). "The Senate has a role to play. It is a
second chance in our constitutional structure that most of the time is a damn nuisance
because Presidents cannot make commitments until after those commitments have been
ratified by the Senate." Id.
The first occasion on which the Senate gave only conditional approval, requiring
renegotiation of a treaty before the final advice and consent, was the Treaty of 1797
with Tunis. See ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra, note 2, at 36. The first occasion on
which the other party refused to renegotiate, and the Treaty therefore failed to enter
into force, was the King-Hawksbury Convention of 1803 with Great Britain. See id.
The Senate used to be known as "the graveyard of treaties," but, in fact, the
overwhelming proportion of treaties are approved relatively expeditiously and without
changes. Only four treaties this century have been voted down by the Senate. See ROLE
OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 103, 117-18; see also SFRC SALT II REPORT,
supra note 35, at 28 (noting that 1789, the Senate has approved nearly 1400 treaties
while voting to reject only 16).
177 For example, President Taft declined to proceed with ratification of the 1911
Arbitration Treaties with France and Great Britain when the Senate attached impor-
tant reservations. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 303, at reporter's note 3; see also
ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 125-26 (discussing examples of treaties a
President declined to ratify after Senate consent).
178 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; see also Lobel, supra note 113, at 1114-15
(stating that the President does not ordinarily have power to violate treaty unilaterally).
179 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also ROLE OF THE SENATE supra note
2, at 136-39 (reporting various controversies regarding Congress' failure to pass
promptly legislation necessary to implement treaties); L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at
161-62 (stating that the principle has not yet been resolved on whether Congress is
obligated to pass legislation for implementing a treaty).
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role. Indeed, the roles are so interrelated that even self-executing agree-
ments may be stymied by congressional action or inaction, including the
override of a presidential veto of legislation that would supersede the
treaty.180
Finally, the President seems to have the sole authority to terminate
an international obligation of the United States,' though the power to
end a treaty is by no means the same as the power to modify one. The
process of establishing an amended treaty is essentially the same as the
process of creating a new treaty ab initio, starting anew the sequence of
shared and uncertain powers.' 82
b. Interpreting Treaties
Several players also figure in the interpretation phase. The Presi-
dent's interpretation is, in one sense, primary, for it is in the context of
his near-plenary authority to conduct foreign relations that diplomacy
will give international effect to an official United States interpreta-
tion.' However, Congress, also "interprets" treaties. It assesses, as a
domestic political and legal matter, what the document requires and
what additional action should be taken within the constitutional scope
of legislative powers to promote United States interests. 84
180 See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
181 See L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 167-71; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2,
§ 339; see also Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F. 2d 697 (D.D.C.), vacated and remanded,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (a divided Supreme Court dismissed, on justiciability grounds,
Senators' suit for review of President's decision to terminate treaty with Taiwan); N.
CALvo-GOLLER & M. CALVO, supra note 33, at 140-41 (surveying legislative and
executive roles in precedents concerning treaty termination); Finkelstein, Star Wars
Meets the ABM Treaty: The Treaty Termination Controversy, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 701, 715 (1985) (the President is authorized to terminate a treaty without
congressional action in the event of another nation's breach); Lobel, supra note 113, at
1121 (President has power to terminate, but not to violate, treaties); Comment, supra
note 68, at 772-76 (analyzing methods for terminating the ABM Treaty).
182 See Glennon, supra note 81, at 919 (President may not effectively call a new
or amended treaty a mere interpretation of an existing treaty).
1s See L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 167. The President will take into account
a court's interpretation of a treaty, but in the conduct of international affairs, the Presi-
dent may adopt a different interpretation for dealing with other sovereigns. See id. at
416 n.128; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 326, comment b.
184 See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 317 (1907); United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886). Both Rauscher and Browne refer to the "[clongressional
construction of the purpose and meaning of extradition treaties" revealed in subsequent
legislation as evidence of the legislative understanding of the law of the treaty. Browne,
205 U.S. at 317. As far back as the Washington Administration, the Executive asked
the Senate's advice on interpreting or implementing a treaty. In 1791, France protested
the application of certain American requirements to ships as inconsistent with the
treaty of 1778. After considering the question, the Senate sided with the American
Executive. See ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 2, at 35. Similarly, in 1797, the
President referred to the Congress a question about implementation of the treaty with
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Courts also regularly interpret treaties in cases and controversies
before them, establishing important principles of international and for-
eign relations law.185 The courts ordinarily demonstrate great deference
to the Executive's interpretation of a treaty, attempting to avoid the
possibility of embarrassing the President with a conflict.1 86 There are
cases that present a very sharp conflict between executive and judicial
interpretations, however, in which the courts have declined to give a
treaty the sort of interpretation that the Executive desired.187 Moreover,
Algiers. See id.; see also L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 416 n.127 ("In passing the
Panama Canal Act of 1912, Congress apparently interpreted the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty as exempting American vessels engaged in coastwise trade from paying canal
tolls, as did President Taft. Wilson later interpreted the Treaty differently and induced
Congress to repeal the statutory exemption.").
More recently, it has been conceded that the President could not effectively switch
to adoption and implementation of the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty by a
simple "flick of a pen." Rather, a President would have to obtain congressional assent
for the funding of additional SDI activities. See 1985 SDI Hearings, supra note 59, at
397-98 (testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle).
I85 See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,
230 (1986) ("[T]he courts have authority to construe treaties and executive agree-
ments," as well as statutes, even when foreign affairs are implicated); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (partially sustaining presidential action settling
claims arising from Iranian seizure of United States hostages); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37 (1964) ("act of state" doctrine, precluding
review of actions of a foreign sovereign in its own territory, is applicable even when
expropriation of private sugar company allegedly violates international law); Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-89 (2d Cir. 1980) (federal court may hear claim that
a foreign government official, acting abroad under color of foreign authority, violated
international law by using torture); see also L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 165-67,
205-24 (discussing cases in which the courts have enforced treaty obligations).
American courts frequently interpret treaties when private rights of individuals are
at stake. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191 (1961) (treaty determines
that Yugoslavian residents and citizens could inherit land in Oregon, despite restrictive
state law); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1924) (treaty requiring equality
for aliens overrides contrary state statute); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198, 235
(1796) (peace treaty, establishing system for payment of private debts, supersedes con-
trary state law).
i86 See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)
("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Govern-
ment agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great
weight."); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (state escheat statute invali-
dated because it might intrude into foreign affairs); Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 194-95
(court relied upon diplomatic notes and correspondence to establish meaning of 1881
treaty); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933) (Court influenced by con-
sistent State Department interpretation of extradition treaty); Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829) ("It is scarcely possible, that the courts of either [nation
in the boundary dispute] should refuse to abide by the measures adopted by its own
government."); Coplin v. United States, 761 F.2d 688, 690-92 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (consis-
tent executive interpretation of a treaty, even when expressed in diplomatic exchanges
long after negotiation of the treaty, is entitled to great weight), affd, 479 U.S. 27
(1986).
187 See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 335-42 (1939) (Court disagreed with Execu-
tive's current interpretation of a naturalization treaty with Sweden, favoring earlier
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situations do emerge in which a court speaks definitively to the treaty's
meaning in the domestic law context, while the President is free to as-
sert a different interpretation vis-a-vis other nations."'
Despite their own active role, courts have been reluctant to inter-
vene in controversies between the two political branches of government.
Often they cite the "political question" doctrine,189 or "standing" ' as
interpretation); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936)
(denying President any implied discretionary power under a treaty with France to ex-
tradite United States citizens); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1907) (refus-
ing to implement Executive's interpretation of an extradition statute with Great Brit-
ain); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 326, reporters' note 2 (citing United
States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979); United
States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978)).
188 See President's Message to the Senate on the Soviet-United States Intermedi-
ate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 779, 780 (June 10,
1988) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court may well have the final judgment [regarding the inter-
pretation of the INF Treaty], which would be binding on the President and Senate
alike."); L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 167; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 326.
19 Under the political question doctrine, courts have held a number of issues to be
nonjusticiable, being reserved for resolution by the Legislative and Executive Branches.
The leading case articulating the doctrine is Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which
establishes the guidelines for courts in applying the doctrine to the foreign affairs area.
See id. at 211-12; see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (vacated on other
grounds) (four Justices vote to dismiss as political question a Senator's suit challenging
the President's decision to terminate a treaty). But see Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S.
at 229-30 (1986) (interpretation of treaty and statutes not political question, even
though foreign relations involved); Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question": A
Response, 101 HARV. L. REv. 524, 529 (1987) (expressing dislike for the political
question doctrine as being "at odds with our commitment to constitutionalism and lim-
ited government"); Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597, 600 (1976) (arguing that "there may be no doctrine requiring abstention from
judicial review of 'political questions' ").
19. The "standing" requirement mandates that a lawsuit be brought by someone
who has more than "the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional govern-
ance." Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974). A
plaintiff with standing is one whose stake in the controversy is within "the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion." Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
Even members of Congress do not have standing automatically to challenge execu-
tive actions assertedly beyond the authorization of a statute or the Constitution. Con-
gressional standing exists only if the Executive's actions have effectively nullified a pre-
vious legislative vote or an opportunity to vote. See, e.g, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d
697, 703 (D.C. Cir.) (Senators had standing to sue regarding presidential decision to
terminate treaty with Taiwan because they had not been afforded an opportunity to
vote), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (member of Congress lacks standing to challenge covert
actions and secret funding of CIA); see also McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The
New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 266-67 (1981) (courts should hesitate to take suits
in which members of Congress attempt to circumvent the political process); Note, Con-
gressional Nuclear Freeze Proposals: Constitutionality and Enforcement, 23 HARV.
J. ON LEGIs. 483, 486-93 (1986) (summarizing federal courts' treatment of standing
issues in various contexts); Note, The Justiciability of Congressional-Plaintiff Suits, 82
COLuM. L. REV. 526, 542-44 (1982) (congressional lawsuits are particularly inappro-
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grounds barring the adjudication of issues touching on foreign affairs.
One very recent case, however, has demonstrated an extremely im-
portant role for the courts in treaty interpretation. In Rainbow Naviga-
tion, Inc. v. Department of the Navy,' 9' the plaintiff shipping company
sought an injunction against the implementation of the Navy's reinter-
pretation of a 1986 United States-Iceland Treaty that regulated the
carriage of military cargo between the two states.1"2
During the Senate's consideration of the Treaty, senior adminis-
tration spokespersons (notably the Counselor of the Department of
State, accompanied by the Commander of the Military Sealift Com-
mand) had testified that the Treaty would be implemented so as to
protect the interests of the sole remaining United States-flag shipper
active on that route.19 3 This assurance was cited in the Committee on
Foreign Relations' report and on the floor of the Senate prior to Senate
advice and consent to the agreement. 94
Shortly after ratification of the Treaty, however, the Navy pro-
pounded a new interpretation of it.19 5 A new system for awarding
transportation contracts for that route was developed, under which
plaintiff Rainbow would likely be shut out, in favor of Icelandic com-
petitors.19 ' When Rainbow sued, the Navy argued that the assurances
priate where a member of Congress seeks to challenge Executive Branch interpretation
of a statute).
For discussions of congressional challenges to executive treaty interpretations, see
Kennedy, supra note 5, at 873-77 (reviewing cases in which courts have denied Con-
gress members standing to challenge treaty interpretations); see also Joint Hearings,
supra note 1, at 414 (statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe) (it is "highly prob-
lematic" to suppose that courts would grant standing to challenge the Executive's inter-
pretation of the ABM Treaty).
The Senate has considered the option of enhancing the role of the courts in inter-
preting arms control treaties, but at least one spokesperson has concluded that "to bring
the issue to resolution in the courts, to render the question 'justiciable,' would be com-
plex and time consuming. It is therefore important ...to avoid court action." Joint
Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Sen. Biden).
91 686 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1988); see also United States v. Stuart, 57
U.S.L.W. 4263, 4267 (1989) (asserting that nontextual sources such as "a treaty's rati-
fication history and its subsequent operation" often assist the court to implement the
parties' intent).
192 This was the third time that the parties had contested similar aspects of the
controversy. For a synopsis of the dispute, see Rainbow Navigation, 686 F. Supp. at
354-55.
193 See id. at 358.
194 See id.
"9 See id. at 356.
.9. Under the original system, one competition was to be held each year, with the
lowest bidder winning a contract to carry 65% of the Navy's cargo and the second
lowest, from the other country, winning the right to carry 35%. In 1987, Rainbow was
the second lowest bidder, and took the 35% share. Under the Navy's proposed revision,
there would be two competitions each year, one for 65% of the cargo and the other for
35% of the cargo. In each competition the lowest bidder would get the contract. Thus,
13991989]
1400 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
offered to the Senate during the advice and consent period were not
legally binding. The Navy contended: 1) that the Treaty was not in-
tended to be self-executing, 2) that a private plaintiff such as Rainbow
had no standing to sue, and 3) that previous government statements
interpreting the Treaty in favor of Rainbow were merely
"precatory."'1 9 7
In response to the Navy's arguments, Judge Harold Greene told
the Justice Department litigator: "You are taking the same position
that the State Department is taking on the [INF] Treaty, that whatever
is said to the Senate doesn't mean anything."1 8 Judge Greene con-
cluded that the government could not, on the one hand, represent to the
Senate that the Treaty would be self-executing and would preserve
Rainbow's presence on the Icelandic route and, on the other hand, as-
sert in court that the Treaty created no justiciable issue in protecting
Rainbow's right to compete fairly for contracts.1 "9 The judge stated that
the United States interest in good relations with an ally could not be
pursued in violation "of the solemn representations made to the United
States Senate in connection with the ratification of that treaty."2 ' He
then granted Rainbow's motion for a preliminary injunction.201
As encouraging as the Rainbow Navigation case may be for recog-
nizing the shared responsibilities of the Congress, the Judiciary, and
the President, it is unlikely to be a harbinger of future increased judi-
cial activism in the national security area. Only rarely will a court be
presented with such egregious circumstances, and the Executive Branch
will not ordinarily replicate the Navy's heavy-handed attempts at uni-
lateral reinterpretation. Judge Greene's decision, however, also illus-
Rainbow might have been second lowest in each competition, and obtain neither con-
tract. See id. at 360.
117 See id. at 356-57 & n.17.
198 The Treaty and Its Enemies, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1988, at A26, col. 2 (edito-
rial). The government's position in Rainbow Navigation was even more extreme than
the Sofaer Doctrine because the representations made to the Senate in 1986, in connec-
tion with the Iceland Treaty, were so definitive and so heavily relied upon by the
Senate, that they would meet even the three strict criteria of the Sofaer Doctrine. See
supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Yet the Justice Department denied that
even these explicit assertions were binding. See 134 CONG. REC. S6774 (daily ed. May
26, 1988) (statement of Senator Nunn) (noting that the Administration had disavowed
the representations of the Navy and the State Department as "precatory" and "non-
binding").199 See Rainbow Navigation, 686 F. Supp. at 358-59.
200 Id. at 361.
20 See id. In a subsequent phase of the litigation, the Navy appeared to concede
that it was bound by the representations it had made to the Senate during the ratifica-
tion hearings. See Rainbow Navigation's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion For
Summary Judgment, Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, No. 88-
0992 (HHG) (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1988), at 2 n.1.
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trates the converse point, that courts' traditional deference to executive
decisions is only a limited self-restraint, and that the customary judicial
reluctance to intervene into sensitive matters of international and fed-
eral politics can be stretched too far.
3. The Senate has a variety of mechanisms for establishing its
interpretation of a treaty.
The Senate has at its disposal a range of options for expressing
qualified approval of a treaty and for influencing its implementation.
Provisos labeled as amendments, reservations, understandings, and dec-
larations vary in the degree to which the new legislative direction
would alter or augment the obligations of the treaty. 202 A new typology
has identified three distinct classes of Senate expressions: Category I
provisions do not involve any formal notice to the other party; Category
II provisions are formally communicated to the other party as official
United States government positions, but do not require acceptance or
acknowledgement by the other party; Category III provisions require
explicit agreement by the other party before the treaty can come into
force.203
The Senate also has available a range of options regarding the
appropriate legislative vehicle for expressing its view of a proffered
treaty. The most explicit device for affecting interpretation is through
the resolution of ratification. By means of provisions in this resolution,
the Senate can directly instruct the Executive (and the other party) re-
garding the specific changes or restrictions that would be necessary
before the Senate will provide its consent and allow the treaty to be
made. Similarly, the resolution of ratification can serve as the mecha-
nism for the Senate to declare plainly its "understanding" of the treaty
or its future intentions regarding policy choices in a way that does not
change the negotiated treaty but does overtly influence the surrounding
legal or political milieu.
202 See supra note 176. The Senate has affixed a variety of provisos to arms con-
trol treaties with different degrees of precision and explicitness. See Sofaer, ABMT Re-
ports, supra note 77, at S6674-75. With rare exceptions, all Senate provisos have been
communicated to the other parties to treaties. See, e.g., id. at S6669 (the general prac-
tice is to secure agreement of the other party to all such conditions by exchange of
diplomatic notes); GENOCIDE CONVENTION REPORT, supra note 144, at 15 (noting
that the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain was the most recent
deviation from practice of transmitting all Senate conditions to other party).
203 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 314, reporters' note 1. This typology was
created by the Foreign Relations Committee in connection with the SALT II Treaty.
See SFRC SALT II REPORT, supra note 35, at 28-35. It has become a standard part
of the analysis of treaty reservations.
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The Senate also may express its qualified approval of a proposed
treaty in a less prominent manner through other oral or written legisla-
tive tools. The treaty report from the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, for example, or statements made by leadership on the floor of
the Senate may sometimes serve as expressions of the Senate's collective
position.2 4
There are, however, situations in which the Senate's collective un-
derstanding or interpretation of the treaty has not been expressed at all
and is therefore, especially difficult to discern. The most problematic is
when there has been complete congressional silence on a particular
matter. Sometimes the absence of expression on point may indicate that
the Senate shared an understanding so basic that no elaboration was
required. A particular matter may be thought to be so obvious or so
well-accepted that it attracts no controversy and, in the tumult of the
legislative process, inspires no explicit time and attention, yet subse-
quently emerges as a point in contention.2" 5 At other times, silence sig-
nifies, instead, that the Senate simply had no considered view of the
subject.206
204 See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 57 U.S.L.W. 4263, 4267 (1989) (using floor
debate and President's transmittal documents to interpret the language of a treaty pro-
vision ratified by the Senate);Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 82 (statement of Profes-
sor Louis Henkin) ("The same principle [that the President may make only a treaty
that means what the Senate understood it to mean] governs when the Senate's under-
standing of a treaty provision is not expressed in a formal resolution, but is apparent
from the Senate's deliberations leading to its expression of consent."); 1987 SFRC RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 40 ("Implicit understandings represent informal - but equally
significant - conditions placed on the Senate's consent."); RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, § 314, comment d; Biden & Ritch, supra note 83, at 5 (noting that Senate intent
need not be registered explicitly, but can with equal significance be implicit).
205 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 394 (joint statement of Abram Chayes
and Antonia H. Chayes) (asserting that the very absence of Senate reservations or un-
derstandings about the meaning of the ABM Treaty indicates that everyone agreed
upon the interpretation that emerged from the plain meaning of the text and had been
sponsored by executive branch witnesses); INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 93 (noting
that implicit understandings represent Senate acquiescence with executive representa-
tions; Legislature's silence cannot change an Executive's explanations of the meaning of
a treaty, but can reaffirm them); Biden & Ritch, supra note 83, at 5 ("In truth, the
Senate's understanding of a treaty is usually implicit - that is, registered via accept-
ance of Executive representations."). But see Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 128
(statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Advisor) (noting that it is
dangerous to infer Senate approval of a witness's statement merely from acquiescence
- the Senate must deal in generalities and often has no shared understanding of minor
points).
206 Often, the most important debates about a treaty occur away from committee
meetings and from the Senate floor, taking place in Senators' offices where there is no
record. See Joint Hearing, supra note 1, at 113 (statement of Senator Hollings). But
even these off-the-record conversations may play a role in creating a Senate "under-
standing" of a treaty.
If the Senate gives no indication of its understanding of a treaty, it must be as-
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A comparison with the legislative process by which the Congress
creates ordinary domestic law provides an illuminating analogy. 07 Ob-
viously the clearest method for the Congress to affect United States'
jurisprudence is through the words of the statute. While even these ex-
pressions will be subject to varying interpretations, there is ordinarily
little doubt that Congress intended to express something in the specific
language of the statute. Other legislative tools of lesser dignity (or of
greater subtlety), however, are also relevant in the law-making process,
and thus influence subsequent interpretation. 0 8 Courts frequently scru-
tinize the language of a committee report, a floor colloquy, or a debate,
in order to ascertain the intentions of the legislative drafters.20 9 More-
over, occasionally when these overt expressions provide insufficient
guidance, a court will attempt to adduce what the Congress "must
have" intended by parsing the ordinary meaning of the language and
the surrounding context and by inferring what the Congress would
have said about a particular point had it taken the occasion to be ex-
plicit about all the underlying shared assumptions and understandings.
sumed that the Senate understood the treaty to mean what it would be understood to
mean by reasonable people, reading the treaty in good faith, in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of the words in their treaty context. See id. at 82 (statement of Pro-
fessor Louis Henkin). But see Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6,669 (stat-
ing that one should not infer lightly that the Senate intended to implace unilateral
conditions upon United States in consenting to a treaty).
207 The State Department Legal Adviser and the Department of Justice Office of
the Legal Counsel have asserted that there are two views concerning the role of legisla-
tive history in treaty interpretation. The first would consider the Senate's advice and
consent record to be directly comparable to the Congress' record in statute-writing,
according equivalent weight to both types of documents and analyzing them in a simi-
lar fashion. The other perspective would give significantly less weight to the Senate's
work regarding a treaty than to the Congress' work regarding a statute, on the grounds
that only the "drafter" of a law is entitled to extra deference, and the drafter of a
statute is ordinarily the Congress, but the drafter of a treaty is the Executive. See
Sofaer ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6673; OLC Memorandum, supra note 83,
at 2; cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951)
(concluding that a bill's legislative history, statements of the bill's sponsors are more
important than those of its opponents).
208 See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50, 61 n.12 (1975) (referring to congressional reports to aid in construction of the
National Labor Relations Act); Seacast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872,
877 & n.7 (1st Cir.) (referring to legislative debate in interpreting the Administrative
Procedure Act), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) .
209 In regard to the interpretation of treaties, see United States v. Stuart, 57
U.S.L.W. 4263, 4267 n. 7 (1989) ("[R]eliance on the Senate's preratification debates
and reports [is not] improper."). For a discussion of the Court's use of legislative his-
tory more generally, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7
(1987) (legislative inaction "may not always provide crystalline revelation" but "may
be probative to varying degrees"); National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
612, 639-40 (1967) (cautioning against reliance upon views of legislative opponents
who tend to overstate the reach of a disfavored provision).
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A particularly problematic treaty interpretation issue arises when
the Senate derives its understanding of a particular clause in large mea-
sure from the Executive's initial interpretation, and the Senate then
fails to articulate its acceptance of the Executive's view in the resolution
of ratification or in any lesser legislative vehicle. Executive presenta-
tions regarding recently-concluded treaty negotiations ordinarily will be
especially compelling to the Senate and likely to generate a shared, al-
beit perhaps inexplicit, understanding of what the text means. In these
circumstances, persuasive executive testimony supportive of the Legisla-
ture's reading of the treaty's plain language influences the Senate's un-
derstanding yet passes unnoted.
The point here is not that the President or a successor should be
"estopped" from later asserting a contrary interpretation.21 Rather, the
President's representations, once accepted by the Senate, contribute to
the development of a particular interpretation that, by law, has become
affixed to the treaty text. It is the binding law, not an estoppel, that
compels the outcome. Determining whether the Senate formed a coher-
ent view of a particular clause, therefore, is the essential inquiry; the
origin of any such interpretation is less important.2"
Tacit forms of Senate understanding present substantial problems
of proof. It is obviously easier to be confident about "what the Senate
wanted" when the entire body has gone on record with an up-or-down
vote on the question whether to include a particular provision in the
resolution of ratification. Report language, floor colloquies, and the
like, often are more ambiguous expressions of intent, and subsequent
analysts may question the degree to which the Senate as a whole sub-
scribed to the views of any few leaders.212
Despite these practical problems of establishing the existence and
terms of an unwritten Senate understanding, once such an understand-
ing has been shown to exist, there is no conceptual difficulty in assess-
210 But cf. OLC Memorandum, supra note 83, at 14 (arguing that "the President
would, in effect, be estopped from taking a contrary position in his subsequent interpre-
tation of the treaty" after the Senate relied upon a particular interpretation he had
presented).
211 Executive statements, however, can be useful in providing evidence of what the
Senate must have had in mind, based upon the materials before it at the relevant time.
See Stuart, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4267-68 (referring to President's transmittal message to
support an interpretation of the language of a treaty provision ratified by the Senate);
infra text accompanying notes 249-53.
212 See, e.g., SFRC SALT II REPORT, supra note 35, at 34 (citing the misunder-
standing over the effect to ge given conditions attached to a treaty with Spain). But see
Stuart, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4267 n.7 ("A treaty's negotiating history . . . would in fact be
a worse indicator of a treaty's meaning [than preratification Senate materials] for that
history is rarely a matter of public record available to the Senate when it decides to
grant or withhold its consent.").
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ing its legal status. The Senate's understandings and conditions, how-
ever evidenced, are fully binding upon the President once the treaty is
"made." The Senate's view of the treaty, whether explicit or implicit, is
an integral part of the treaty, and the President cannot proceed to rati-
fication on any other terms.213 The President may decline to ratify the
treaty altogether, but he cannot selectively dispense with the Senate's
input.214 In effect, the Senate gives its advice and consent to a particu-
lar treaty regime, not a blank check for any other type of arrangements
that the President may desire.21 5
It is dangerous to construe congressional silence, and courts are
often understandably reluctant to draw conclusions where there is scant
213 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 314. The President usually has included
a verbatim recitation of any Senate reservation, declaration, or understanding, in the
instrument of ratification. See id. comment b. As Professor Henkin has stated: "Of
course, the President can only make the treaty to which the Senate has consented. He
cannot make a treaty other than the one to which the Senate consented. . . . he cannot
make a treaty with a meaning different from the one to which the Senate consented."
Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 81. But see id. at 130 (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, State Department Legal Advisor) ("When [the Senate] gives its advice and con-
sent to a treaty, it is to the treaty that was made, irrespective of the explanations it is
provided.").
In Power Auth. of New York v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 541
(D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as moot sub nom. Amer-
ican Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth. of New York, 355 U.S. 64 (1957), the Second
Circuit denied the status of "law of the land" to a Senate reservation to a treaty with
Canada dividing the waters of the Niagara River. The reservation specified that the
United States' share of the water would be allocated among domestic users only by an
Act of Congress; the court ruled that this was not a proper reservation, since it was of
domestic impact and importance only. See id. at 539. Therefore, the Second Court held,
the reservation was not legitimately a part of the treaty, despite Canada's explicit ac-
ceptance of it, and United States waters could be allocated by actions of competent
administrative agencies, as well as by Congress. This decision has been criticized, in a
vigorous dissent as well as by others, as failing to recognize that the Senate, in consider-
ing a treaty, may condition its consent in almost any fashion, at least when there is a
colorable connection to the content of the treaty. See id. at 548 (Bastian, J., dissenting);
L. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 134-36 & n.28; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the
Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLuM. L. REv. 1151, 1176-79 (1956).
214 But see New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1898). In this
case the Senate had attached several provisions that would reduce the amount of money
and land allocated to a group of tribes in a treaty. Most of these reservations were
accepted by the Indians and included in the ratified treaty, but one was dropped some-
how - the President did not include it in the proclamation, for reasons that do not
appear in the Court's decision. See id. at 22-23. The Supreme Court gave effect to the
treaty, and severed the unpublished reservation, denying the Senate enforcement of its
condition. See id.
215 Commentators generally agree that if the Senate explicitly insists upon an in-
terpretation of a treaty and incorporates its position in the resolution of ratification,
then it binds the President if the treaty is made. The difference of view, however,
centers on the degree to which less formal, or unstated, Senate understandings - espe-
cially those that may have been generated tacitly by representations from executive
branch spokespersons - are similarly entrenched. See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra
note 77, at S6672.
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evidence of real congressional notice.21 But once the difficult questions
of proof are overcome, there should be little debate about the legal sta-
tus of congressional understandings of the treaty-making process. If
Congress had a specific intention and a court can deduce from these
secondary sources what that intent was, then that intent is binding and
becomes part of the.statute or treaty. The President cannot unilaterally
ignore a congressional directive merely because it is obliquely or
unartfully expressed. The President has a constitutional responsibility
to enforce the entire law, including any portions of it that are revealed
by indirect or tacit means.2
17
4. The critical moment for measuring the intentions of the Congrcss
and the Executive is the time at which the treaty is made.
The advice and consent period is the only time when the Senate
has the authority to affect directly the content and meaning of a treaty.
At this juncture the Senate can exercise the power to condition its con-
sent and thereby entrench a particular interpretation as law. Once this
moment has passed, however, and the treaty has been made, subsequent
Senate expressions about its import or desirability no longer carry any
special status.2"' After ratification, the treaty that stands is the one that
216 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987)
(Court split on how to evaluate legislative inaction); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185
n.21 (1969) (rejecting argument that congressional inaction constituted endorsement of
Department of Agriculture's interpretation of statute); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119-22 (1940) (refusing to consider congressional inaction an endorsement of priorjudicial interpretation). But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599
(1983) (congressional inaction constitutes endorsement of Internal Revenue Service's
interpretation of tax exemption provisions); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
678-799 (1981) (inference that legislative inaction reflects acquiescence in executive ac-
tions is even stronger in foreign affairs sector). See generally Easterbrook, Legal Inter-
pretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoIL'Y 87, 93-94
(1984) (concept of legislative intent is amorphous and judges have limited power to
insert new meaning into ambiguous statutory language); Eskridge, Interpreting Legis-
lative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 70 (1988) (arguing that the legislative inaction
decisions are "about presumed, rather than actual, legislative intent").
21 7 Of course, not every committee report or floor debate reflects legislative con-
sensus or purports to be binding. Sometimes individuals or groups declare their own
intentions or understandings, but there is no evidence that the legislature as a whole
adopted their position as a part of the law. Furthermore, sometimes a committee report
declares merely what should be done, as opposed to what shall be done. But these are
problems of proof - albeit often insurmountable problems for the proponents of an
effort to rely upon an incomplete legislative history as an expression of law. The legal
principle, on the other hand, remains relatively straightforward: where there is an as-
certainable congressional intent, it is binding, even if it is expressed via committee or
floor action rather than in the text of a statute.
218 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 326, reporters' note 1; see also Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901) ("The meaning of the
treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some of those who may have
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was made, and a subsequent congressional attempt (other than through
the passage of new law) to state authoritatively what the document does
or should mean is too late to be binding. 19
By the same token, the President's ability to implant a binding
understanding is similarly limited to the phase of treaty consideration
prior to ratification. Once the Senate has given its advice and condi-
tional consent, the President must either accept the Senate's terms or
decline to make the treaty. A President cannot ignore Senate conditions
or unilaterally alter them. A fortiori, if the President presents the treaty
in one way, and the Senate accepts that understanding, it would render
the advice and consent process futile if the Executive were later free to
depart from those earlier representations.
These principles do not require that the meaning of a treaty must
be permanently frozen until a subsequent law-making activity fulfilling
the requirements of bicameralism and presentment explicitly supersedes
it.22 Indeed, judicial interpretation of a treaty or statute, or of the Con-
voted to ratify it."); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899) ("The construction of
treaties is the peculiar province of the judiciary; and, except in cases purely political,
Congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights under a treaty, or to affect
titles already granted by the treaty itself.").
210 Again, the comparison to statutes is revealing. Congress has wide powers to
affect the meaning of pending legislation through eclectic means (via committee reports,
floor debates, etc.), but these powers wane once the bill becomes law; a subsequent
Congress ordinarily can change the original meaning of a law only through another
enactment. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) (noting that posten-
actment statements by congressional committees "are not entitled to much weight" in
interpreting the intent of statute); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980) (asserting that the intent of the enacting Congress, not a
later Congress, is controlling); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979)
(stating that a Senate report written eleven years after passage of legislation does not
control judicial interpretation); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200
n.7 (1977) (intent of Congress after enacting Congress not controlling); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) (asserting that the
intent of the enacting Congress, not a later Congress, is controlling). But see Seatrain
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (arguing that the views
of a subsequent Congress are entitled to significant weight, especially when the intent
of the enacting Congress is obscure); Easterbrook, supra note 216, at 91(rules of statu-
tory construction are a total jumble; for every supposed rule there is a contrary rule).
220 See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6,672. Judge Sofaer describes
an illuminating example of treaty reinterpretation accomplished by joint action of the
Executive and the Legislature concerning the.1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with Great
Britain. Treaty to Facilitate the Construction of a Ship Canal, Nov. 18, 1901, United
States-United Kingdom, 32 Stat. 1903, T.S. No. 401. In 1911, President Taft had
interpreted the Treaty to mean that certain American ships were exempt from paying
Panama Canal tolls, and Congress had legislated its agreement, in the Panama Canal
Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-337, 37 Stat. 560, 562 (1912). President Wilson, however,
considered that interpretation to be "in plain contravention of the Treaty," and he
asked Congress to rescind it, which Congress did by statute in 1914. Act of June 15,
1914, Pub. L. No. 63-113, 38 Stat. 385, 386 (1914); 51 CONG. REc. 8944, 8944-45
(1914).
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stitution itself, may be adapted to evolving circumstances, importing
new meanings to old law and legislative history.22' But the process of
accretion and erosion has limits - there is a difference between a per-
missive reinterpretation of a law and the creation of a new law. The
text and surrounding materials of a treaty can be stretched only so
far.2
22
On some occasions, the Senate and the President may not have
formulated any particular interpretation or understanding about a spe-
cific clause at the time the treaty was made. Under these circumstances,
no legal standard is initially created, leaving greater scope for subse-
quent executive or judicial interstitial law-making. But where the Sen-
ate did impose conditions upon its consent, and the President ratified
the treaty subject to those understandings, the entrenched treaty law
should not be so malleable.223
5. Strict mutuality of treaty obligations is unlikely and legally
unnecessary.
While it may seem anomalous to include a discussion of treaty
mutuality under a heading of constitutional considerations, it is not un-
common for protagonists in the treaty interpretation debate implicitly to
assume that the principle of mutuality has almost constitutional ramifi-
cations. It is sometimes asserted that strict "mutuality of obligations" is
an inherent and vital aspect of international agreements, and that any
asymmetry in parties' commitments is somehow indicative of impropri-
ety or folly.224 In fact, however, this mirror-imaging of treaties may be
221 It has been argued that the Supreme Court is more willing to overrule prece-
dents (that is, to change its own interpretation of the law) in constitutional cases than
in statutory cases. The difference is attributed to the Court's realization that it is very
difficult for the political process to reverse the Judiciary on constitutional matters (by
amending the Constitution), but relatively easy for the Congress and President to take
effective action to assert a different statutory preference (by passing new legislation).
See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988).
Treaties might be an even more extreme case because the participation of another sov-
ereign adds an element even more removed from the United States political process.
One might expect, therefore, even greater willingness of the judiciary to play an active,
revisionist role.
222 See Gross, supra note 75, at 46-52 (disputes about treaty implementation
should be resolved by renegotiation, not reinterpretation).
221 Cf Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
863-64 (1984) (finding that where a statute and legislative history are ambiguous, EPA
has authority to interpret the statute flexibly, including the power to change its inter-
pretation by implementing new regulations from time to time).
224 See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 49 (statement of Senator Specter)
("The basic treaty principle, as a matter of contract, is that there has to be mutuality.
So, if the Soviet Union is not bound, is the United States bound?"); id. at 124 (state-
ment of Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Advisor) ("[T]he Senate is as
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the exception, rather than the rule, and it is, in any case, wholly unnec-
essary as a matter of law.
Reciprocity225 and "equal security" '228 may be important political
aspects of most arms control accords, but there are several situations in
which a desirable treaty regime may impose asymmetrical obligations
upon its parties. First, the negotiated terms of the treaty itself may cre-
ate differing requirements for the participants. Even parties that have
equal bargaining power may, as in the case of the SALT I Interim
Agreement, agree to retain stockpiles of armaments that are unequal in
numbers but otherwise equivalent in power.22 7 Or, they may find it
expedient to agree on unequal reductions in arms in order to reach
lower, equal ceilings.228
responsible as the President for making sure that the contracts made in behalf of the
United States are mutually enforceable and do not create unilateral duties."); Presi-
dent's Message to the Senate on the Soviet-United States Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force Treaty, supra note 188, at 780 ("As a practical matter, the Senate condition [to
the INF Treaty] only can work against the interests of the United States by creating
situations in which a treaty has one meaning under international law and another
under domestic law. Unilateral restrictions on the United States should be avoided,
especially in a treaty affecting vital national security interests.").
Oddly, in the debate regarding the Biden Condition to the resolution of ratification
of the INF Treaty, see supra notes 90-112 and accompanying text, the Executive
Branch's concern over possible non-mutuality of treaty obligations seemed self-defeat-
ing. In fact, the only way that non-mutuality could occur in this context was if the
Executive Branch had not fully and accurately apprised the Senate of the complete
picture of the treaty obligations that had been negotiated between the delegations of the
United States and the Soviet Union. As long as the Executive presented a comprehen-
sive disclosure of the obligations that the United States was entering, then the Senate
and the Executive would share a "common understanding." The Senate's fear partially
concerned this precise point - that the Executive might not have been punctilious in
disclosure, such that the Soviets might have other understandings or interpretations not
provided to the Senate. In a sense, the Reagan Administration was arguing: "Don't
bind us to what we've told the Senate, because it's possible that we've cut a somewhat
different deal with the Soviet Union, and although we may not tell you about it now,
it's important that both the United States and the Soviet Union be bound only by the
international deal."
225 See COMM. ON INT'L ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS, ASS'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL: RECOM-
MENDATIONS, BACKGROUND, AND ANALYSIS 35-36 (1985); see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 2, pt. III, at 147 (discussing the resemblance between contract law and
international law).
226 See SALT II Treaty, supra note 51, 18 I.L.M. 1155 (preamble). One com-
mentator has described the language "equal security," which the Soviets have fre-
quently insisted be included in the preamble to arms control agreements, as "an
Aesopian phrase which would entitle them to a force equal to the sum of all the other
nuclear forces in the world." Rostow, Why Is It So Hard to Negotiate with the Rus-
sians?, 6 PACE L. REV. 1, 17 (1985).
227 For example, in the Interim Agreement, supra note 13, the United States and
the Soviet Union agreed, as a temporary measure, tb "freeze" their respective stockpiles
of ICBMs and SLBMs at levels which were quantitatively unequal, but qualitatively
equivalent. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
228 For example, the SALT II Treaty, supra note 51, required the Soviet Union
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Second, there may be ambiguities or gaps in the treaty's coverage
that allow the parties lawfully to move unilaterally in different direc-
tions. Because parties will retain control over their own military forces,
and will implement the treaty in their own interest, they may take dif-
ferent actions that are associated with the items covered by the
treaty.229 For example, the INF Treaty eliminates intermediate-range
and shorter-range missiles, but leaves each party free to retain aircraft
and very-short- range missiles without restriction.2"' The parties may
well react differently to these opportunities, in ways that nonetheless
have implications for the security relationship contemplated by the
Treaty.
Third, the domestic processes leading to treaty ratification may
impose different obligations on the various parties. Some Senate decla-
rations or understandings, for example, are of internal legal effect only,
but they may, nonetheless, create new law for this country governing
areas close to the treaty and having an international importance. 3 1
Subsequent enactments also can create dissimilar arrangements among
treaty powers.
Finally, there is a sense in which treaties are inherently "non-
mutual." An international obligation, even one that on its face is purely
symmetrical, will take its place inside the network of domestic law that
characterizes each of its parties. Since legal systems vary so much, and
the domestic legal environments into which the treaty will move are so
dissimilar, the effects of the treaty also may differ in noteworthy
to undertake greater reductions than the United States in order to reach a common level
of weaponry. See J. GOLDBLATT, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS 35 (1983). Similarly,
the INF Treaty, supra note 8, required the Soviet Union to dismantle more weapons
than the United States, to reduce both sides to zero within the covered categories. See
Linden, INF Faces a Final Hurdle, TIME, Feb. 8, 1988, at 31.
229 For example, the Interim Agreement, supra note 13, and the SALT II Treaty,
supra note 51, both reserved for the United States and the Soviet Union considerable
"freedom to mix," which is the ability of each country to configure its residual nuclear
forces in any way each nation saw fit. The two countries have exercised this freedom
asymmetrically, with the Soviet Union putting a far larger fraction of its strategic forces
into ICBMs and the United States spreading more of its weaponry among SLBMs and
aircraft. See, e.g., STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 1987
SIPRI YEARBOOK 4-24 (1987) (detailing divergent American and Soviet force
postures).
230 The Treaty eliminates all ground-based missiles capable of ranges between
approximately 300 and 3500 miles, but does not apply to shorter-range systems, to sea-
based systems or to aircraft. See INF Treaty, supra note 8, at 1459.
"' If they are not communicated to the other party, Senate understandings or
interpretations formulated during the advice and consent period are not legally binding
upon the other party. They may have some probative value in interpreting the treaty,
as indicia of the parties' contemporaneous intent, but their main function will be to
create domestic law for the country generating them. See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra




The domestic legal environments in which a treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union is implemented, for example, are
starkly different. In the United States, the Bill of Rights, environmental
protection legislation, laws regarding occupational health and safety,
and the Internal Revenue Code, for example, constitute major, unique
parts of the legal milieu in which the treaty is implemented. The subtle
influence of domestic jurisprudence may align government powers and
privileges in the United States in ways that are inapplicable to the So-
viet Union, because of the very different constraints of its own system.
For example, the INF treaty affords the parties identical rights to
destroy excess missiles by explosive means. 2 3 However, the environ-
mental protection laws may effectively forbid such destruction inside
the United States, creating an asymmetry where the negotiators con-
templated none. Similarly, constitutional restrictions on government
searches and seizures might restrict the ability to conduct on-site in-
spections inside the United States, even if no parallel Soviet limitations
exist.2"4
These inherently non-mutual factors mean that whenever a
United States-Soviet Union arms control treaty is concluded, it is
quickly transformed into two treaties, one governing the United States
and a similar, but subtly different one restricting the Soviet Union.23 5
The fundamental obligations under international law remain symmet-
ric, but the governments' respective abilities to take advantage of the
permissions and to implement the restrictions, under their differing do-
mestic law, indicate that the interpretations of the treaty will quickly
diverge.236
232 See Glennon, supra note 81, at 914 (disparity between domestic and interna-
tional obligations of a treaty is "a contingency inherent in the nature of the relationship
between the two legal systems"); see also 1987 SFRC REPORT, supra note 4, at 60 (in
discussing the problem of disparity, the report states that "the problem ... inheres in
the very existence of two separate but interactive systems").
23 See INF Treaty, supra note 8, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimina-
tion of The Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty Between the United States and the
USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
part II, at 1469-74.
224 See Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty
Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 229, 290-91 (1988).
231 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 103 ("It is a truism that the Executive
has different obligations under domestic and international law, and therefore it is possi-
ble to hypothesize situations in which those obligations could conflict. However, in
practice this has not proven to be a serious problem and there is no basis for the Ad-
ministration's assertion that the [Biden] Condition 'would substantially increase this
risk.' ").
28 It might be even more appropriate to conceptualize a treaty as generating as
many as three overlapping but independent bodies of law: one concerning solely the
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It may be poor politics, or poor international strategy, for the
United States to tolerate any gross disjunction between the treaty-as-
domestic-law that constrains the United States and the (corollary, but
presumably less restrictive) treaty-as-domestic-law that constrains the
Soviet Union.2"' Such a disparity, however, may be an inevitable by-
product of the separate sovereignty of the two parties and the disparate
domestic legal systems that inform and give meaning to the treaty as
local law. As long as the United States Constitution retains its structure
of a separation of powers and a two-step process for treaty-making, the
Legislature will retain the opportunity to put its own stamp of ap-
proval and understanding upon any document negotiated by the Execu-
tive. Opportunities will always exist for subtle slippage between the
moment of negotiation and the moment of ratification, thus shattering
the illusion of mutuality.2 8
international obligations of the parties, as they have assumed responsibilities toward
each other that, in theory, could be decisively ruled upon by an international tribunal; a
second concerning the domestic import of the treaty as it is received inside the United
States' legal structure; a third concerning the treaty's effect as domestic law of the So-
viet Union.
The United States will have a political interest in the domestic implementation of
the treaty inside the Soviet Union, and vice versa. But neither will have a lawful claim
to intervene in the other's internal processes, and each will be free to alter its own
domestic law as it sees fit, so long as the international obligations are met. One nation's
domestic arrangements may well constrain it more than the other party's law constrains
its actions, but this anomaly is a matter of domestic, not international, law and it is by
no means necessarily indicative of any failure of the treaty regime. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 2, § 301, comment c, reporters' note 3.
"I See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 372 (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, State Department Legal Advisor) (if the Senate imposed greater restrictions
upon the United States than the treaty itself imposed upon the other party, then the
United States "would be put at a significant disadvantage"). Ironically, however, in the
case of the ABM Treaty, it is the Executive Branch, not the Legislature that is at-
tempting to create a double standard. That is, the Executive Branch posture - stating
that the broad, permissive interpretation is "legally correct," but also declaring that the
United States will voluntarily confine itself to the older, more restrictive interpretation,
as a matter of policy - would give the Soviet Union license to proceed further with
ABM systems development than the United States will.
"I The best way to minimize this area of discontinuity would be for the Executive
to be accurate and effective in conveying to the Senate a full appreciation of the con-
tents and implications of the negotiated treaty. If the text is comprehensively explained,
the Senate's understanding of it should approximate the Executive's own understand-
ing, and they will both be approving substantially identical notions of what the treaty
entails. Conversely, if the Executive is incomplete in its presentation of the treaty that it
has negotiated, then there is a greater danger that the document, as the Senate under-
stands and consents to it, will be somewhat different - perhaps more restrictive -
than what the Executive contemplated and negotiated. See Biden and Ritch, supra note
83, at 6.
Another red herring associated with the argument for mutuality is the claim that if
the ratification process is considered an effective device for making law, then treaty
negotiators would suddenly be forced to assume a major new burden of monitoring each
other's legislative process. In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union already mon-
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III. APPLYING THE LAW TO THE FACTS
This portion of the Article seeks to construct a workable model of
treaty interpretation by applying the general framework of principles
established above to various possible sets of facts. Four hypothetical sit-
uations involving executive reinterpretation of a treaty are presented in
Part A. In light of the conclusions supported by the analysis of these
hypotheticals in Part B, I present an alternative to the Sofaer Doctrine
in Part C. This alternative provides a coherent model of treaty inter-
pretation based on eight interdependent tests that indicate when an in-
terpretation has become entrenched into law. This model is character-
ized by the necessary fidelity to both international and constitutional
imperatives, and the requisite flexibility to meet the exigencies of inter-
national negotiations.
A. Scenarios of Treaty Interpretation
1. Knowing Misrepresentation
In the first scenario, the Executive presents a treaty to the Senate,
and deliberately conceals (or misrepresents) one of the terms. Most
plausibly, this would be a relatively confined, perhaps obscure, issue
that escapes detailed legislative attention when the Executive Branch
assures the Congress that the point is unproblematic because it has
been resolved in a satisfactory manner in the text and classified negoti-
ating history. Later, however, the matter emerges out of the shadows,
itor each other's domestic ratification processes with great interest, just as they study
with care all other developments related to their security concerns. See Joint Hearings,
supra note 1, at 59-60 (statement of Senator Nunn) (Soviets sent observer to the 1972
Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on the ABM Treaty ratification). Never-
theless, the Legal Adviser has asserted that if a state's domestic advice and consent
phase has international significance, United States diplomats would be required to
devote considerable additional energy to scrutinizing a treaty's progress through other
nations' domestic ratification processes. Moreover, they would have to ensure that all
other parties were being equally attentive in studying the events leading to ratification
in the United States. See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6671.
The short answer to this illusion is a return to the previous observation of the
distinction between the international and the domestic law-making aspects of a treaty.
See supra text accompanying note 231. That is, one country's advice and consent pro-
cess cannot impose legal burdens upon the other state - only a mutually-accepted
negotiated agreement can accomplish that. So neither side has an obligation to monitor
the other's domestic processes. On the other hand, each country will ordinarily have a
profound political interest in discovering what its negotiating partner is contemplating,
especially in areas that are intimately connected with an arms control treaty. So while
the advice and consent process does make domestic law for the United States, if it varies
from the obligations assumed by both parties in the negotiations, it is law that is bind-
ing only upon this country. The Soviet Union will, in all likelihood, continue to moni-
tor these developments closely, but will not be constrained by them.
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and the Executive (whether the same or a successor President) advises
the Congress that the constraints actually agreed to by the other party
were not identical to the constraints that the Congress thought it was
approving.'39
2. Subsequent Alteration
The second case arises when the President who negotiated the
treaty does a fair and accurate job of advising the Senate of its contents,
but a subsequent President attempts to twist the treaty to a different
meaning, by unilaterally "reinterpreting" it. In the "pure" case, the
Executive would assert an unconditional ability to reinterpret the treaty
on his own authority, at any time and to any extent. In a more complex
variant, the Executive might argue that selected legal standards said to
govern reinterpretation had been met, and that the factual record was
sufficiently ambiguous to render the proffered change legitimate.
3. "Clear Unclarity"
In the third scenario, the negotiating parties agree that the treaty
does not quite nail down a resolution of some possible future issue.
They recognize that there is a gap or ambiguity in the treaty's cover-
age, but they are nonetheless willing to make the agreement promptly,
and deal with the outstanding issue at a later time. There are many
reasons why the text might be incomplete or unclear in this way, in-
cluding either parties' desire to preserve some future flexibility, the
parties' inability to fashion a mutually acceptable resolution for every
point, and the hope that the lingering issues will not arise in acute
form. A variant of this scenario might occur if there were a comparable
type of ambiguity internal to the United States - an acknowledged
inconsistency or unclarity between the respective executive and legisla-
tive understandings, intentions, or preferences regarding the treaty,
which the participants acknowledge, yet agree to defer resolving.
4. Unforeseen ambiguity
The fourth scenario is similar to the third, except that the parties
are not, at the time of making the treaty, fully conscious of the omis-
sion, imperfection, or ambiguity buried in their joint treaty text. Per-
..9 Compare this scenario with Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 36 (statement of
Senator Biden), describing a similar scenario of the Executive misleading the Senate to
obtain advice and consent to a treaty when the secret negotiating record contains provi-
sions that are substantially different from those disclosed in testimony.
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haps they are trying to work very quickly, perhaps they are insuffi-
ciently prescient about future technological developments, or perhaps
they simply have not been able to imagine and anticipate each possible
loophole and filigree.
B. Analysis
The general framework of principles derived from international
and constitutional law established in Part II will help illuminate the
obligations of the parties in these various scenarios.
1. International Law
The international law constraints on the other party (for example,
the Soviet Union) will be only those established by the international
agreement itself.240 In Scenarios 1 and 2, this means that the Soviets
will be bound by the agreements in the treaty - nothing more (even if
the United States accepts additional obligations as a matter of internal
law), and nothing less (even if the United States drops its additional,
self-imposed internal restrictions). The internal United States misrepre-
sentations or contortions of Scenarios 1 and 2 are thus irrelevant to the
text as binding upon the Soviet Union.
In Scenarios 3 and 4 there is no constraint on the Soviet Union
regarding the omitted points - the lacuna is not filled until the parties
concur on additional limitations. The United States may not like the
measures that the Soviet Union exercises with its freedom, but has no
valid objection in law.24'
Regarding the United States' international obligations, interna-
tional law mandates continuing observance of the treaty's terms by the
United States, as well as by the Soviet Union, in all four scenarios.
Whether the Executive has misled the Congress (as in Case 1) or is
attempting to wrest the interpretation away from the agreed language
(as in Case 2), the treaty nonetheless stands as binding under interna-
tional law.2 42 Again, the United States is no more bound than is the
240 See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
241 In the context of the ABM Treaty, one observer has stated: "The treaty does
not define terms such as 'development' and 'component' that mark crucial dividing lines
between activities that are consistent with the treaty and activities that are not. Thus,
the Soviet signature on the ABM Treaty does not denote a given interpretation of these
terms." Voas, supra note 76, at 1.
242 An argument could be made under these circumstances that the Senate's advice
and consent was void because it was not "informed consent," and therefore, there
should be no treaty at all, under either domestic or international law. But unless the
other party was aware of (and participating in) the constitutional infirmity, the United
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Soviet Union in Scenarios 3 and 4: if the treaty did not establish a legal
regime on point, then the international obligations of the parties do not
extend to issues that might have been covered had the parties consid-
ered them.
2. Constitutional Law
The internal obligations of the United States, however, are more
complex.243 For domestic law purposes, the treaty in Scenario 1 must
include the Executive's misrepresentations. This is the version of the
treaty to which the Senate has consented, and which has become the
law of the land.
If the two sets of obligations are consistent - that is, if the mis-
representations establish constraints that are more restrictive than those
of the international obligations, so that the United States could manage
to comply with both sets of limitations - then that combination of
restrictions is what the President has the responsibility to execute faith-
fully. The United States could, as a matter of domestic law, relax the
additional restrictions, but until a domestic lawmaking step is taken,
both sets of laws must be enforced.
This Scenario could give rise to a troubling possibility. If the
United States acted on its view that the international law interpretation
was less stringent than its domestic law version by modifying its domes-
tic law to loosen the restriction, the Soviet Union might then attempt to
argue that the more restrictive interpretation actually was not a "mis-
take." Rather, the Soviets could assert that the President's original
presentations to the Senate were the more accurate reflection of the
treaty text and negotiations. Accordingly, the same problem that marks
Scenario 2 may arise: the Soviets could contend that it was the later
executive statements that were the distortions. In either case the Soviets
might urge that the more restrictive understanding of the treaty was
required by international law, not merely by domestic United States
law. If the United States persisted in its view and modified its domestic
law to reflect the less stringent interpretation, the controversy could be
presented as a straight international law question of treaty interpreta-
tion, in principle suitable for international adjudication.
A different sort of difficulty arises if the two sets of obligations in
Scenario 1 are not consistent. For example, the Executive's misrepre-
sentation may have created a domestic law that is less restrictive than
States would remain internationally bound. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 550
(letter from Professor Richard B. Bilder).
248 See supra notes 150-223 and accompanying text.
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the international law obligations under the treaty. Nevertheless, if the
lax domestic law is merely permissive, then the President may have the
option to refrain from taking advantage of it, and thereby keep the
United States in conformity with the tighter international obligations of
the treaty. If the domestic law is mandatory, however, then until that
domestic law is changed, the President will be obligated to effectuate
the domestic law, bringing the United States into breach of its interna-
tional obligations and making it vulnerable to the remedies favoring the
Soviet Union.
In Scenario 2, the domestic law of the United States will be the
original treaty, the one that was made with Senate advice and consent.
The "pure" or extreme reinterpretation case, where the Executive as-
serts an unconditional authority to change the treaty interpretation uni-
laterally, appears to be impermissible on its face; the President can no
more single-handedly change this aspect of United States jurisprudence
than he can change any other domestic law. If the treaty has become
integrated into the law of the land, and the Senate's original interpreta-
tion is sufficiently entrenched, then unilateral reinterpretation cannot
be effective.
If the facts of the controversy place it into the more complex vari-
ant of Scenario 2, however, the President may argue that there is no
interpretation so well established as to be immutable, thus justifying a
reinterpretation. The next section of this Article presents circumstances
that justify or limit reinterpretations, and describes the factors that
must be balanced to determine whether the attempt at subsequent alter-
ation should be effectuated.
Where there is a known or latent ambiguity in the text at the time
the treaty is made, as in Scenarios 3 and 4, neither domestic nor inter-
national law will bind the United States. If the President has not repre-
sented to the Senate that there is an agreement on a particular point,
and if the Senate has not registered any relevant understanding, then
the ratification, in effect, gives the President (as well as the Soviet
Union) a blank check. This leeway has been granted knowingly in a
Case 3 situation and unknowingly under Case 4. Any subsequent pres-
idential assertions will not be "reinterpretations" - they will be "in-
terpretations" - and, accordingly, they will not conflict with any pre-
viously expressed will of the Congress. Of course, the Congress may
disagree with the import of the initial presidential interpretation and
may act politically and legally to attempt to defeat it, but this will be
strictly a contest of domestic lawmaking, within familiar parameters.
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C. When Is a Treaty Interpretation "Entrenched" into Law?
This section of the Article attempts to define "entrenchment" by
proposing an eight-pronged test to describe the circumstances under
which an interpretation of a treaty should be considered legally bind-
ing. Taken individually, no one of the eight factors ordinarily could be
dispositive, but all of them may have a bearing in deciding a particular
case. Whenever the Executive proffers a treaty reinterpretation, its le-
gitimacy and its ability to oust a prior interpretation of the treaty can
be analyzed under these eight conditions. The task of the analyst, there-
fore, is to collect the relevant data and balance these eight elements
against each other.
As discussed in Part I, most current assertions about reinterpreta-
tion powers are seriously wanting. At one extreme is the notion that the
President may unilaterally reinterpret international obligations almost
at will, regardless of previous assurances and understandings provided
to the Senate.244 Surely this cannot be correct, for the process of Senate
advice and consent must be constitutionally meaningful and cannot be
circumvented willy-nilly by wholesale executive manipulations. Equally
extreme would be a view that too drastically restricts the Executive's
ability to deal with situations of ambiguity and incompleteness in the
treaty text and negotiating record. The Executive must retain some
flexibility, not being forever foreclosed by inadvertent statements or the
Senate's partial or inchoate impressions.
The most recently asserted Executive Branch standard governing
reinterpretations, the Sofaer Doctrine, is also unacceptable. 245 No per-
suasive legal authority has been cited to support it. The "Doctrine"
seems to have been fashioned on the spur of the moment to meet the
needs of a particular controversy, with no particular basis in law.246 As
a jurisprudential tool, it is incomplete, focusing on only three factors.
Moreover, the nature of those tests calls into question the Doctrine's
objectivity; the tests it proposes for entrenching a binding Senate under-
standing are so stiff that they may only rarely be met. 47
244 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 83-85 (discussing the view that executive representation can be
relied upon only if it has been "generally understood," "clearly intended" and "relied
upon" by the Senate during the ratification process). See generally OLC Memoran-
dum, supra note 83.
246 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 90-91 (maintaining that the Sofaer Doc-
trine, though alleged to have been grounded in "settled principles," in fact does not rely
upon any constitutional basis or precedent); Biden & Ritch, supra note 83, at 5 (same).
24' If the legislative record in Rainbow Navigation v. Department of the Navy,
686 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1988), did not satisfy the government's criteria for a binding
original interpretation, it would seem that few cases could. See supra notes 198-200
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Furthermore, the content of the Sofaer Doctrine's three factors is
unclear - the Legal Adviser has not precisely indicated what is meant
by each of the terms.24 How is one to know, for example, whether a
particular Executive Branch statement was "clearly intended" to influ-
ence the Senate's consideration of a treaty? How does one measure
whether an assertion was "generally understood" by the Legislature,
especially if, in the ABM Treaty context, the Legal Adviser asserts that
this test was not met by the 1972 discussions about future types of
ABM systems? How extensively must the Senate "rely upon" an inter-
pretation, especially when the votes of Senators in the ABM case do not
seem to satisfy the Sofaer Doctrine?
In the absence of agreed-upon limitations, the Executive's asserted
reinterpretation ability under the Sofaer Doctrine threatens both to dis-
rupt political consideration of the merits of arms control policies and to
undermine understanding of and support for the demands of interna-
tional and constitutional law. There is accordingly a need to bring some
order to the issue, to begin to apply to these difficult questions the gen-
eral principles discussed in Part II. The discussion proceeds by consid-
ering each of the eight factors.
1. What did the Senate say about the particular issue when
providing its advice and consent to the treaty?
The most reliable and accessible indication of the Senate's collec-
tive understanding and intention is usually given by the on-the-record
explanations and debates. If key Senators (e.g., party leadership, com-
mittee chairs, floor managers)249 paid careful attention to the specific
matters contained in an original interpretation, and if the particular
item seemed to be an important factor in senators' decisions about how
to vote, then this understanding of the treaty should be more entrenched
in the law and harder to alter subsequently.
It is not always easy to assess the degree of Senate notice based
upon the Senate's words alone. Sometimes, of course, salient issues re-
ceive considerable overt attention, and relatively clear and formal ex-
pressions are placed directly into the resolution of ratification. At other
times, however, important matters receive little explicit attention simply
and accompanying text.
248 See The Doctrine or the Treaty?, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1988, at A30, col. 1
(discussing the three criteria of the Sofaer Doctrine). "Since it's hard to know what this
mumbo-jumbo means, Presidents would be free to do with treaties as they wish." Id.
24 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951)(in interpreting a statute, statements of legislative sponsors are more authoritative than
the expressed fears of its opponents).
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because they are so very well accepted, and there is no controversy to
incite debate. Often, the Senate registers its understandings relatively
informally, with a comment in the Foreign Relations Committee hear-
ings or markup,250 in the committee reports,2 51 or in floor debate,252
rather than in the resolution of ratification. Occasionally, it is even nec-
essary to attempt to draw meaningful inferences from virtual silence.25 3
Whenever good faith analysis indicates that the Senate has formed a
definite understanding on a point of interpretation, that understanding
should be imported into the treaty as the law of the land.
On the other hand, if the point now in controversy was initially
simply overlooked, attracting little attention, and no Senator seemed to
care much about it, then it will be considered less entrenched.2 4 There
can be no "magic number" defining how many Senate statements or
votes are sufficient to establish a firm understanding, but given the lim-
itations upon the Senate's ability to devote time and attention even to
important matters, a very small number of explicit comments - partic-
ularly if they come from leading or expert Senators - should be pow-
250 Jurisdiction to review negotiated treaties is vested solely in the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, but other committees, including the Armed Services Committee and
the Intelligence Committee (as well as their counterparts in the House), also often
assert an interest and the right to act in connection with a proposed agreement. See
OLC Memorandum, supra note 83, at 5 n.9.
251 Compare United States v. Stuart, 57 U.S.L.W. 4263, 4267 n.7 (1989) (Bren-
nan, J.) (it is "eminently reasonable" to consult committee reports in interpreting
treaty language because "preratification reports [are not] kept under seal") with id. at
4269 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the Senate's "unquestioned power" to attach
conditions to the resolution of ratification: "[I]t is a far cry from all of this to say that
the meaning of a treaty can be determined ... by legislative history of the sort that we
have become accustomed to using for the purpose of determining the meaning of domes-
tic legislation.") and Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 6-8
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (improper to rely upon committee reports for
details of legislative intention because reports are drafted by staff and are not voted
upon by legislators).
252 See Stuart, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4267 (referring to floor debate in discussing the
meaning of a treaty provision); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311
(1979) (scrutinizing sponsor's floor statements in colloquy with other legislators, and
statements by several other Senators in order to ascertain intended interpretation).
25 Under the Sofaer Doctrine, any implicit, unstated Senate understandings
would be less reliable and more susceptible to subsequent reinterpretation since the
Senate did not overtly declare its conditions. But if the Senate were silent on a point
simply because a particular understanding was so widely shared and so generally ac-
cepted that no further comment was deemed necessary, then the Sofaer Doctrine would
have the perverse effect of jeopardizing the most basic points of consensus. See Biden &
Ritch, supra note 83, at 5-6.
25 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) (one isolated remark by
a single Senator is insufficient to establish congressional intent); Joint Hearings, supra
note 1, at 88 (statement of Professor Louis Henkin) ("We have to distinguish, however,
between an understanding in some essential respect and matters which are of little
significance. The Senate may not have any understanding about some matter which the




2. What was said to the Senate, creating an understanding of the
treaty, prior to ratification?
Statements by Executive Branch witnesses, representing the nego-
tiating delegation and drawing upon the confidential record of ex-
changes with the other nation, can be especially compelling in generat-
ing a senatorial understanding or interpretation. Where these
presentations are relatively clear, consistent, and voluminous, the inter-
pretation they present will be more entrenched and more difficult for
subsequent Presidents to dislodge.256
Similarly, the more high-ranking and knowledgeable the spokes-
persons, and the more well-considered their presentations, the more
they could reasonably be deemed to have had a substantial impact upon
the legislators' understanding, and the more durable this original inter-
pretation will be.251 7 The official section-by-section analysis of the
255 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 87 (statement of Professor Louis Hen-
kin). Professor Henkin noted:
The views of individual Senators have to be considered in the context of
the whole deliberative process of the Senate. The question is what was the
understanding of the Senate, as a whole, in giving its consent.
It is difficult to disentangle the views of a particular Senator from a
general Senate understanding. Often it is not possible to determine the
understanding with certainty and clarity. But where several statements are
made and there is general acceptance of their tenor, that is the Senate
understanding.
Id.; see also id. at 162 (statement of Senator Biden) (noting that only a few senators
typically acquire expertise on a particular topic, and others will tend to defer to their
statements and judgments); Finney, A Historical Perspective, in THE ABM TREATY:
To DEFEND OR NOT TO DEFEND?, supra note 62, at 42 ("it is probably fair to say
that only a half dozen senators fully understood the provisions of the [ABM] Treaty
dealing with future development of ABM systems").
25' See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6673; cf O'Connor v. United
States, 479 U.S. 27, 32-33 (1986) (citing consistency of Executive's interpretation of
Panama Canal Treaty as a factor entitled to great weight); United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 31 (1982) (in interpreting legislation, court attaches "great
value" to agency representations to Congress when the agency administrators partici-
pated in drafting the legislation and made their views known to Congress during com-
mittee hearings). But see Austasia Intermodal Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 580 F.2d 642, 645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (testimony at hearings should not be
accorded undue weight in interpreting statutes, since the views of witnesses may not be
the same as views of legislators).
257 See, e.g., NATO Defense Hearings, supra note 76, vol. 1 at 28 (Senator Nunn
questioning Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci to ascertain that he is "an authorita-
tive witness" and "speaking for the President of the United States and for the adminis-
tration"); 133 CONG. REC. S2978 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987) (statement of Senator
Nunn) (noting that weight should be given to the 1972 John Foster testimony regard-
ing the ABM Treaty, even though he was not a member of the negotiating delegation,
because he was a presidential appointee in the Department of Defense, the highest-
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treaty, provided in the Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal, will be a
most authoritative source,258 and special weight will be given to pre-
pared statements, or to written responses to Senate questions, where the
entire government is presumed to have collaborated on the reply.2"9
However, less formal statements may also have had an impact on
the Senate. Testimony from experts outside the administration may
contribute to the Senate's understandings, and non-testimonial state-
ments by administration spokespersons (in public speeches, press con-
ferences, and the like) may have an impact, as the public record helps
mold Senate understanding.
In keeping with the notion that key Executive Branch influences
cannot subsequently be denigrated, it will be more legitimate for a sub-
sequent administration to rebut an original interpretation when condi-
tions suggest that the earlier statements did not create a common Senate
understanding: 1) if the issue was covered only sparingly and obliquely;
2) if administration witnesses were inconsistent on a particular point;
or 3) if the original interpretation was sponsored only by relatively jun-
ior, or relatively uninformed authorities, especially when speaking "off
the cuff" (as in impromptu oral responses to spontaneous questions),
rather than pursuant to detailed, coordinated executive branch
instructions. 60
In the same vein, any "secret agreements" - understandings be-
tween the two negotiating delegations or between the two heads of
state, which are not communicated to the Senate - will have no impact
upon domestic United States law. The Senate cannot have any under-
standing of, and cannot express any consent for, the terms of a hidden
deal that was never displayed for its cognizance.
ranking technical official there, and the third-ranking civilian).
.5 In its 1988 report on the INF Treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee expressly noted that the Secretary's article-by-article analysis of the provisions of
the Treaty "constitutes a formal Executive representation as to the meaning of the INF
Treaty and the obligations to be assumed by the United States under the Treaty."
INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 109. In its 1979 report on the SALT II Treaty, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee determined that "Executive Branch comments, in
general, adequately describe and explain the agreement provisions," and the commit-
tee's own explanatory comments were added only where further elaboration was desira-
ble. SFRC SALT II REPORT, supra note 35, at 319.
259 Cf Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 546 (letter from Professor Richard B.
Bilder) (stating that in interpreting a negotiating record to clarify ambiguities in treaty
text, a tribunal will accord more weight to the written or oral accords reached by the
heads of the delegations than to the work of lower-ranking members).
260 See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6,673.
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3. What has been the attitude of the other party to the competing
interpretations of the treaty?
Neither state party, of course, holds a veto over the domestic polit-
ical processes in the other nation. Nonetheless, the views of the other
party may not be ignored. Where the negotiating partner is ambivalent,
or even agreeable, a reinterpretation will be more viable than when the
other party insists on maintenance of the original understandings."' In
some instances, even the views of non-parties who are implicated in the
treaty regime may also be relevant.
4. How much support is there in the treaty text and record for the
two interpretations?
If the treaty text, the negotiating record, and the legislative history
are all congruent, then a new interpretation will be harder to sustain.
However, if the documentation is ambiguous, or a fortiori, if the origi-
nal interpretation is now appreciated as an incorrect, aberrational read-
ing of the treaty and its record, then a reinterpretation is more
tolerable.
5. What is the record of "subsequent practice" of the treaty
parties?
How - and for how long - have the parties operated under the
original interpretation, and what did they say at the time about their
legal obligations to do so? If the parties' behavior has been consistent, if
they have acted out of a sense of legal commitment (rather than simple
habit or comity), and if substantial "reliance" interests have built up,
then the original interpretation is more entrenched. 262 To the extent
261 See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Professor Gordon
Brewster Baldwin) (arguing that the line between an interpretation and an alteration
of a treaty is not sharp; the party in the best position to make that judgment regarding
the ABM Treaty would be the Soviet Union); Rhinelander, Reagan's "Exotic" Inter-
pretation of the ABM Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1985, at 3, 6 (arguing
that if there were any legitimate doubt about the correct interpretation of the ABM
Treaty, the best approach would be to ask the Soviet Union to reaffirm the traditional
interpretation; if the Soviets were unwilling, then the reinterpretation would be more
justified); see also O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986) (citing Panama's
failure to challenge the application of the United States' view as grounds to support the
United States' interpretation of the tax provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty); Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (in interpreting the Warsaw Convention on
air travel, the Court finds "the opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to consid-
erable weight" (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979))).
262 See O'Connor, 479 U.S. at 33 ("The course of conduct of parties to an inter-
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that the Senate, the public, the other party, or other relevant actors
have aligned their affairs in reliance upon the continuing viability of
the original interpretation or understanding, it will be harder to al-
ter.263 Conversely, where the patterns of implementation are ambiva-
lent, and the costs of reinterpretation are lower, it will be more feasible
to promote a change. 8 4
6. How different is the new interpretation from the old?
In general, the more substantial the proferred change, the more
appropriate it would be to implement it via treaty amendment or stat-
ute rather than via reinterpretation." 5 Lesser, non-central modifica-
tions are more tolerable, as allowance is made for incremental growth
in the treaty regime.
7. Does the new interpretation purport to create new obligations, or
to release old ones?
Although the distinction between affirmative and negative obliga-
tions may be a slippery one, there is in international law a principle
that limitations on the autonomy of a nation are not to be presumed.266
Therefore, in general, it will be harder to implement new constraints
via a reinterpretation, and it may be somewhat easier to relax contested
obligations by that device.26
national agreement, like the course of conduct of parties to any contract, is evidence of
its meaning.").
263 See Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 22 (holding
that Thailand's acquiescence over many years regarding a borderline established by a
map drawing is binding).
264 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863
(1984) (where statute and legislative history are ambiguous, EPA has authority to in-
terpret statute flexibly, including power to change its interpretation by implementing
regulations from time to time); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-
82 (1969) (where agency has given consistent interpretation of statute, and Congress
has ratified that interpretation with subsequent legislation, a court will give that view
great weight); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 492 (1931) (ad-
ministrative agency's consistent construction of a statute over many years will not be
disturbed judicially except for reasons of great weight).
265 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 102-03 (statement of Professor Henkin).
266 See Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (French Republic v. Turkish Republic), 1927
P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7).
267 Cf Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (rejecting a narrow
reading of an extradition treaty that would have confined it to acts that are criminal in
both countries, saying that, generally, a more liberal construction of a treaty, enlarging
the rights which may be claimed under it, is preferred).
[Vol. 137:1353
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
8. Are there any changed circumstances that affect the treaty?
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus"' suggests that a fundamental,
unforeseen alteration in the relevant factual basis for a treaty may be a
valid reason for non-application of its terms. Even short of complete
negation of the treaty, circumstances may have changed in ways that
arguably could help justify a new interpretation.269
In sum, these eight factors define a method for assessing the legiti-
macy of a treaty reinterpretation whenever the Executive purports to
deviate from an original understanding of the meaning of the agree-
ment. If, on balance, one concludes that the original interpretation has
- via the operation of these eight factors - become "entrenched" in
domestic law, then the President may not unilaterally depart from it.
On the other hand, if these factors do not suggest that the original un-
derstanding has risen to the level of "law of the land," then there was
no established interpretation to begin with. The President may then
proffer one (an act of original interpretation, not reinterpretation), and
the other branches of government will proceed, as they deem fit, to
accord it more or less deference.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Unilateral Modifications in the Meaning of United States
Treaty Obligations Should Not Be Undertaken Easily or Often
This Article has argued that there is no such thing in American
law as a power of treaty reinterpretation - that once the meaning of
an international agreement is established, the President has no constitu-
tional authority unilaterally to alter it. The underlying question is
whether the "original interpretation" has become entrenched in law.
The history of a particular treaty constitutes a complex factual record
for applying and weighing these eight factors to answer that question.
But at least the legal effect is straightforward: if at the time of making
the treaty, the Senate did have a particular understanding of it, the
268 This doctrine posits that the basic international law doctrine of "pacta sunt
servanda" ("treaties should be honored") will apply only "rebus sic stantibus" ("so
long as circumstances stay the same.").
29 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 62; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2,
§ 336. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is an exceptional remedy, to be applied only
when important changes have frustrated the operation of the treaty. See RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 2, § 336, comment a; see also 1987 SFRC REPORT, supra note 4, at
102 (minority argues that fundamental circumstances have changed sufficiently - So-
viet violations of arms control treaties, failure to conclude a treaty providing for deep
cuts in strategic offensive arms, and the emergence of SDI technology - so as to war-
rant amending or terminating the ABM Treaty).
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President can make the treaty only subject to that understanding -
and it can be changed only by a subsequent lawmaking activity that is
of equal stature under the Constitution.
On the other hand, if the Senate did not, at the moment of giving
its advice and consent, have a crystallized particular understanding on
point, then there is a gap in the law. Any subsequent executive action
will be an "interpretation," not a "reinterpretation," and will be ac-
corded the customary (that is, partial) deference by the other branches.
Under these circumstances, the Executive's interpretation will not be
binding law upon the United States or the other party, and it may be
freely altered again in the future.
This conclusion does not require any loss of flexibility or adapta-
bility of the treaty power. The eight factors for entrenching an under-
standing will not be easy to satisfy, and the meaning of a treaty, like
the meaning of the Constitution or a statute, remains free to evolve over
time as circumstances warrant. Even when the Executive has sponsored
testimony that helps elucidate the meaning of the treaty during the ad-
vice and consent period - presentations that ordinarily carry great
weight in entrenching a specific meaning for the treaty - there may
still be scope for subsequent reversal if, for example, the Senate ignored
or resisted the original interpretation, or if it was inconsistently or un-
persuasively presented.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that any revised execu-
tive interpretations or other modifications in United States treaty obli-
gations should be exceedingly rare. The shared legislative-executive
role in creating treaties requires that the Senate's participation be
meaningful, and that, in turn, requires that Executive Branch represen-
tations be reliable.270 The need for stability and predictability - both
in internal political debates and for the conduct of United States foreign
relations -argues that "entangling alliances" should be created with
care, adhered to with precision, and, when the occasion demands,
changed in an overt, direct fashion, with full participation of the Senate
and the President (as well as the other party), rather than by a sudden
270 There is also an international dimension to the concern for the reliability of
authoritative executive branch statements to the Senate. That is, it is strongly in the
United States' interest for our senior spokespersons to be appreciated as important com-
mentators on the meaning of treaties: this image will enhance the prestige of the United
States, and the power of United States officials to sponsor definitive interpretations of a
treaty, so they can be used to advantage in future interpretation disputes with other
parties. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 60 (statement of Senator Nunn); cf.
HFCA ABM Hearings, supra note 56, at 53 (comments of Ambassador Ralph Earle)
("Any treaty can be reinterpreted to suit one's own desires, but it certainly makes your




The Sofaer Doctrine would empower the Executive to shed the
effects of prior statements unless impossibly strict conditions were met.
This simply gives the President too much leeway to frustrate the Sen-
ate's constitutional responsibility. Indeed, if neither the ABM Treaty 7
nor the Rainbow Navigation173 case qualifies under the Sofaer Doc-
trine as having a sufficiently entrenched original interpretation, it is
difficult to see how any realistic treaty-making record could withstand
subsequent executive revisionism.
The bottom line is that the Constitution mandates that the Senate
play a role in creating international obligations for the United States.
Moreover, because the Executive negotiates the text of the treaty, the
Senate must be able to depend upon authoritative executive representa-
tions in order to give meaningful advice and consent. To permit the
President to avoid the consequences of interpretative assertions ad-
vanced on the government's behalf, and to field a new interpretation
with so little regard for the record of Senate participation and reliance
is tantamount to a classic "bait and switch."
B. The Senate Has A Legitimate Stake in Reasserting Its Role in
Creating Treaties
To a large extent, the problem of reinterpretation, in the case of
both the ABM Treaty and the INF Treaty, was thrust upon the Con-
gress, not instigated by it. The Executive Branch precipitated the con-
frontation by propounding the Sofaer Doctrine to justify the attempted
modification of the ABM Treaty, and by reasserting the Doctrine when
the issue resurfaced in the context of the INF Treaty.27 Effective judi-
cial review of the issue seemed unlikely because, even with the prece-
dent set by Rainbow Navigation,2 75 the hurdles of standing, and the
political question doctrine probably preclude a court from resolving the
271 See Morrison, supra note 77, at 1752 (quoting Senator Kassebaum that if
modification of the ABM Treaty is necessary, reinterpretation "is the wrong way to do
it," and formal renegotiation should be undertaken).I72 See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
24 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 87-89 (Senators considering the INF
Treaty dealt with the reinterpretation question "by necessity, not by choice"). In the
view of the Legal Adviser, it is the Senate that was at fault, for failing to be sufficiently
clear in the resolution of ratification regarding the precise terms upon which it was
consenting to the ABM Treaty. See Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6674.
In the OLO Memorandum, supra note 83, at 2, the Department of Justice advised that
the ratification record "cannot be ignored in the interpretation process," but proceeded
to accord it very little weight.
275 Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. United States 686 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1988).
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merits of these sensitive national security matters. 271 Accordingly, Con-
gress was well within its mandate in tackling the reinterpretation prob-
lem and in seeking a method to resolve it. Congress's longstanding spe-
cial interest in arms control matters - where vital issues of national
security are at stake - made it especially important that the Legisla-
ture not cede undue authority to the Executive Branch.
Ordinary legislation probably could have provided a suitable bat-
tleground for resolving this question.2 7 Congress could have enacted a
statute (including overriding a presidential veto) explicitly forbidding
actions inconsistent with the Senate's interpretation of the ABM
Treaty, the INF Treaty, or any other international agreement. 27 ' The
limitations on SDI activities that Congress implanted into the Depart-
ment of Defense authorization legislation provide a partial illustration
of' this technique, effectively (though indirectly) prohibiting funds for
any purposes that violate the original interpretation of the ABM
Treaty. 9
From one perspective, the recourse to ordinary legislation might
actually be the superior method for entrenching a congressional inter-
pretation, because it does not complicate the treaty-making process or
require the assent of other parties. In the context of the ABM Treaty,
where the initial phase of the Treaty's lifespan has long since passed, it
may be Congress's only remaining alternative.
In the case of the INF Treaty, however, direct work on the resolu-
tion of ratification was available and the Senate was fully justified in
taking advantage of it. That strategy, however, has created a lingering
anomaly yet to be resolved. That is, the terms of the Biden Condition
reach only the INF Treaty, not any of its predecessors or successors.
What, then, is the regime applicable to the ABM Treaty and to hun-
dreds of other existing treaties for which no similar language was in-
cluded in the appropriate resolution of ratification? Moreover, must the
language of the Condition now become a standard part of the boiler-
2 6 See supra notes 189-90.
2 7 See Cutler, Keeping the ABM Treaty Alive: What Congress Can Do, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1987, at 10, 11 (maintaining that it would be constitutional for
Congress, by statute, to require the Executive not to engage in any actions that would
violate a stated interpretation of a treaty).
27. The Senate considered the option of dealing with the ABM Treaty interpreta-
tion controversy by ordinary legislation. However, many felt that the issue was of con-
stitutional scope, rather than being confined to the question of which particular SDI
experiments would be authorized. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of
Senator Biden) ("One technique, that of legislating compliance with the treaty's correct
interpretation, could be effective on a policy level, but would fail to meet the constitu-
tional issue head-on.").
271 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 137:1353
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
plate used in the Senate's consent to all future agreements? If the view
presented in this Article is correct, the solution to this problem lies in
the fact that the Biden Condition simply states a truism of international
and constitutional law. It is, therefore, legally redundant as a policy
device, for even without its language in the resolution of ratification,
the principles it espouses would be read into the treaty by the force of
the Constitution.80 At the same time, however, the Biden Condition
may have been politically necessary - a reassertion of enduring princi-
ples that had recently been called into question by the executive branch.
In addition to its utility in reaffirming the respective roles of Sen-
ate and Executive in treaty ratification, the process of attempting to
identify and highlight "interpretation" questions may be salutary for
the process of effectuating a treaty. Regarding the INF Treaty, for ex-
ample, the Senate labored mightily to ensure that it understood and
fully supported the Executive's work. This resulted in a high degree of
probing of the interstices of the agreement, including an exceptionally
thorough hearing process. Partly as a result of intensive Senate scru-
tiny, various latent ambiguities were identified and potential future
problems were anticipated and satisfactorily resolved. For example, the
question of the applicability of the agreement to "future types" of inter-
mediate range weapons had not been explicitly resolved in the treaty
text, but upon senatorial prompting, representatives of the United
States and the Soviet Union were able to confirm their joint under-
standing that such systems were included within the scope of the
Treaty.2
8 1
Finally, it is also important to note that the conclusions reached in
this Article do not resolve the factual or substantive questions of ABM
Treaty interpretation that opened this issue in the first place. That is,
even if one agrees that the Sofaer Doctrine is overbroad and too per-
missive of reinterpretations, one could still advocate the broad interpre-
tation of the ABM Treaty favored by the Reagan administration by
280 The Foreign Relations Committee noted that in this respect its proviso may
have been unnecessary, but members felt compelled to act in a fashion that would
clearly signal nonacquiescence in the Sofaer Doctrine. See INFT REPORT, supra note
8, at 97; see also Smith, supra note 5, at A17, col. 6 (quoting Paul C. Warnke) ("It
has always been the law that what the executive branch says to the Senate in present-
ing a treaty for advice and consent is legally binding. Now you can say it again, but
that still won't change anything and it would not prevent some subsequent group of
miscreants from violating the law.").
21 See Oberdorfer, U.S.-Soviet Terms Set for Treaty, Wash. Post, May 13, 1988,
at Al, col. 6; INF Treaty Resolution of Ratification, condition 2, 134 CONG. REc.
S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988) (requiring President to obtain official Soviet agreement
that diplomatic notes exchanged on May 12, 1988 regarding "future technologies"
weapons and other details shall have the same legal force and effect as the Treaty
itself); see also supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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using the eight factors identified above to examine the record. One
could argue, for example, that the 1972 testimony supporting the origi-
nal interpretation was too ambiguous or too contradictory to entrench
any durable Senate understanding.8 2 As the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee noted in evaluating the Biden Condition, the principle that au-
thoritative Executive Branch statements must be legally binding is logi-
cally separable from the application of that principle in evaluating any
particular case. 8 3
C. The Process of Creating National Security Treaties Should Not
Be Burdened Any More Than It Already Is
The United States has experienced grave difficulties in bringing
the national security treaties that it negotiates into force.2 4 The INF
Treaty (which, despite overwhelming domestic support, required some
six months between signature and ratification) was the first significant
arms control agreement to win Senate advice and consent since the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention28 5 and the Geneva Protocol 8 6 in 1975. In
the interim, three major bilateral accords (the SALT II Treaty,28 7 the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty,28 8 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty)28" were negotiated and signed by the United States and USSR,
but have languished without a Senate vote.
This poor record of ratification calls into question the reliability of
the United States as a negotiating partner and jeopardizes its ability to
create future agreements. 29 0 The success of the INF Treaty may be a
282 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 449 (statement of Sen. Hollings).
283 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 90, 106; see also Joint Hearings, supra
note 1, at 55 (statement of Senator Nunn) (the debate over the reinterpretation of the
ABM Treaty should not be cast in terms of whether one is for or against the Treaty
itself).
28 The United States's unwillingness to ratify the Versailles Treaty and join the
League of Nations after World War I has been cited often as a major cause of the
failure of the interwar security structure. See, e.g., F. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES, 1920-1946, at 283-92 (1986) (discussing the causes of
the failure of the League).
285 Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 21.
288 Geneva Protocol, supra note 12.
287 SALT II Treaty, supra note 51.
288 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3,
1974, United States-USSR, 13 I.L.M. 906 [hereinafter TTBT] (signed but not
ratified).
28 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28,
1976, United States-USSR, 15 I.L.M. 891 [hereinafter PNET] (signed but not rati-
fied). Like the TTBT, the PNET has lingered on the calendar of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, as Presidents have failed to push for ratification. See ACDA
TREATY BOOK, supra note 14, at 171-72.
290 See, e.g., R. EINHORN, NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH: LEVERAGE IN U.S.-
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harbinger of a more responsible future, but in the interim, pressing
concerns about the process of domestic evaluation of negotiated treaties
remain unaddressed, and several specific recommendations seem in
order.
First, the Senate should not become accustomed to examining the
details of the classified negotiating record leading to arms control agree-
ments. These records are voluminous and cumbersome, and the benefits
of exploring them are not usually as illuminating as the task is burden-
some. More importantly, the contents of the negotiating record - re-
flecting exchanges between the United States Executive and the Soviet
counterpart - do not affect the internal law of the United States. Any
secret deals made or interpretations exchanged during the negotiations
are not properly before the Senate, unless the Executive formally brings
them forward."9'
Moreover, exposure of the negotiating record carries an inherent
cost of jeopardizing the confidentiality and frankness of the negotiating
process. Delegation members' "memcons" are their official reports to
their superiors, and those reports would probably become less direct,
and less useful, if the authors had to write with one eye on a future
congressional audience.292 The Foreign Relations Committee should
therefore be applauded for its decision to distance itself from the bulk
of the negotiating record in the INF Treaty case, and this decision
should serve to reaffirm the privacy of the negotiating process.2 93
Second, the Senate and the Executive should not use the evaluation
of one treaty as the occasion to refight the battles of another treaty.
SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS 71-75 (1985) (Soviet negotiating behavior is
affected by their perceptions of United States resolve, coherence and consistency, as well
as by the President's ability to muster domestic support).
291 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 100-01 ("[B]y seeking possession of the
myriad internal executive memoranda comprising the 'negotiating record,' the Senate
would impose upon itself a considerable task with no clear purpose.").
292 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 94 (statement of Professor Gordon Brew-
ster Baldwin) (claiming that American and foreign diplomats would be inhibited if they
knew that the negotiating record would later be made public); id. at 98 (statement of
Professor Louis Henkin) (stating that negotiating records of most treaties are made
public, but usually only after 50 or 60 years, when damage to important interests is less
likely).
This point, however, may already have been irretrievably lost. The ABM Treaty
reinterpretation controversy has led to the premature declassification and public release
of so much of the negotiating record that future negotiators will have to assume the
high likelihood of similar future exposure. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REc. S6809 (daily ed.
May 20, 1987) (report by Senator Nunn) (examining Sofaer's analysis of the ABM
Treaty negotiating record); Sofaer, ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6640-63 (re-
printing material from the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty).
293 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 100-01; see also Joint Hearings, supra
note 1, at 33-34 (colloquy between Senators Biden and Wilson regarding the advisabil-
ity of declassifying the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty).
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That is, the process of providing advice and consent to the INF Treaty
during the spring of 1988 was inevitably complicated by its relationship
to the reinterpretation question of the ABM Treaty. Although a tempo-
rary resolution was eventually reached, and the INF Treaty was rati-
fied, it is distressing that a document of such great importance could
not be evaluated solely on its own terms. The INF Treaty, like most
arms control agreements, is so significant and so complex that it de-
served the Senate's focussed attention. A new arms control agreement
should not be held hostage while the Congress and the Executive spar
on other matters. Political linkage of some sort is perhaps inevitable,
but it should be minimized in favor of the prompt and thorough assess-
ment of the pending treaty.
Third, internal United States interpretations of its domestic and
international law obligations ordinarily ought not to be officially com-
municated to the other party to the treaty. Common executive-legisla-
tive interpretations, of course, will be of interest to the other state,2"4
but they are not part of the international law created by the treaty. It
simply confuses matters to convey these interpretations officially, ac-
cording the Soviet Union the occasion to protest, disagree, or otherwise
complicate affairs. In the past, the Senate has acted soundly in this
area, deciding during the INF Treaty process, for example, to treat the
Biden Condition as a Category I proviso, thus not requiring notification
of, or acceptance by, the Soviet Union. 95
D. In Establishing an Authoritative Interpretation of a Treaty for
Purposes of Domestic Law, the United States Should Not Overlook
the Possibility of Authoritative International Adjudication
The final suggestion of this Article is a counterpoint to its main
theme, and sounds a warning about the potential of a different form of
danger latent in overly restrictive treaty interpretation. As noted, trea-
ties have implications for both domestic and international law, and
294 The Soviet Union regularly monitors the progress of bilateral treaties through
the process of Senate advice and consent by sending observers to committee hearings.
See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 59-60 (statement of Senator Nunn) (Senators
Goldwater and Jackson had noted on the record the presence of a Soviet official
throughout the extensive discussion of the ABM Treaty during the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee hearings in 1972). But see id. at 128 (statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, State Department Legal Adviser) (noting that the United States regards itself as
having no duty to monitor other nations' ratification processes; it would be cumbersome
to do so, and we could never ensure that other states were reciprocating); Sofaer,
ABMT Reports, supra note 77, at S6,671-72 (same).
291 See INFT REPORT, supra note 8, at 99-100; see also supra note 203 and
accompanying text (discussing the typology of conditions outlined in the RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 2, § 314).
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these implications may not be congruent. In Part II, we saw that for
municipal purposes, the official United States interpretation is disposi-
tive: any understandings or interpretations that are read into the treaty
at the time of ratification will be law of the land, binding upon all
three branches, and subject to change only through the law making
process.
For international purposes, however, the United States does not
have the last word. Although no arms control treaties currently provide
for independent international adjudication,29 other types of important
international agreements do commit the United States to binding arbi-
tration 297 or to other neutral adjudication.29 In those instances, when
presented with an issue of treaty interpretation, the international tribu-
nal would weigh the competing views offered by the parties, and deter-
mine authoritatively what the treaty means in the international context.
If the ruling goes against the United States, this country will have
the power (although not the "right") to decide whether to comply with
the order of the international proceeding and take actions necessary to
conform to the new authoritative position, or, conversely, to stand in
violation of it. This choice may be a difficult one, and many factors will
influence the decision. But it would not serve United States interests to
be preemptively locked in to the position that the United States will
never change its position or interpretation without amending the treaty.
The Biden Condition to the INF Treaty resolution of ratification
is unclear on this point. It provides that "the United States shall not
agree to or adopt an interpretation different from [the current execu-
tive-legislative understanding of the treaty] except pursuant to Senate
advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol, or the enactment
of a statute.'29 9 Under this language, could the United States reliably
296 The INF Treaty, supra note 8, art. XIII, at 1468, creates a Special Verifica-
tion Commission, and the ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. XIII, at 3444, calls for the
establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, both of which are empowered to
discuss compliance questions and other matters. But these institutions are not indepen-
dent tribunals; they are essentially negotiating fora under the control of the parties to
the treaty and are able to resolve matters only by consensus.
29 Recourse to binding arbitration has become increasingly important as a mecha-
nism for resolving international disputes. For example, United States and Iranian
claims arising from the seizure of American hostages in Teheran and the freezing of
Iranian assets in the United States were submitted to a claims commission for settle-
ment. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665 (1981).
29 Although the United States withdrew from participation in the "compulsory
jurisdiction" of the International Court of Justice in 1985, the Reagan Administration
recently indicated a greater interest in agreeing with the Soviet Union to utilize the
International Court more frequently - at least in cases that do not involve security
considerations. See Oberdorfer, U.S. Now Urges Greater Use of World Court, Wash.
Post, Oct. 7, 1988, at A34, col. 1.
299 134 CONG. REC. S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988); see also notes 97-106 and
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submit disputes to binding international adjudication? Does the lan-
guage require that, whenever the United States's interpretation is re-
jected, this country will resist the authoritative international interpreta-
tion, unless the other party agrees to renegotiate the treaty (and give up
in diplomacy a victory it just won in litigation) or new domestic United
States law is created to effectuate the new ruling?
This type of unilateralism in foreign affairs is not a sound device
for aiding the establishment of a viable network of international law
and order. The Biden Condition, on its face, does not require this hos-
tility toward international law, but neither does it seem to contemplate
any expansion of the sphere within which international adjudication
can be effective. Perhaps any such developments are a long way off, at
least in the sphere of arms control and national security, but it seems
appropriate to note that over-vigilance in entrenching a particular in-
terpretation into United States law may not be fully consistent with a
willingness to join the international community in enhancing the role of
binding international dispute resolution.
E. Summation
We may end this discussion by restating the obvious point that the
authority to reinterpret treaties would be a powerful tool in the hands
of the Executive, allowing a President to revise settled treaty law uni-
laterally. Such authority is, however, alien to the Constitution, in which
the separation of powers guaranties Senate participation in the estab-
lishment, as well as in the amendment, of treaty law.
It may not be easy to determine, in any particular case, whether
the Senate has in fact formulated and "entrenched" an understanding
or interpretation of a treaty, but the eight factors outlined above are
designed to guide that inquiry. One of the more important points is
that Executive Branch testimony should be treated as particularly com-
pelling evidence of what was integral to creating an enduring legislative
understanding. The negotiators of the treaty authoritatively offer inter-
pretations which can inspire Senate reliance and thereby become bind-
ing, even if the Senate does not write them into the resolution of ratifi-
cation, and even if the Senate's acceptance of the Executive's
interpretation must be inferred from virtual silence.
What is fundamental is that the fact of the Senate's advice and
conditional consent create the terms upon which the Constitution al-
lows the treaty to be made. These understandings cannot be divorced
accompanying text.
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from the text of the agreement - they establish the binding domestic
law of the land. Respect for the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers, and appreciation for the standards of international law, there-
fore, compel stark limitations upon Executive Branch treaty
reinterpretations.

